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Over the past few years, heightened management attention
to the increased complexity and sophistication of contract
requirements and of weapon systems acquisition has intensified
the number, frequency, extent and complexity of the studies,
analyses, and other documentation required in support of the
acquisition process. During this same time period, personnel
cuts and staffing constraints have resulted in a decrease in
appropriate government in-house expertise. In this environ-
ment of increasing requirements and decreasing resources,
greater reliance is being placed on industry to provide the
expertise the Government lacks.
Concurrent with this demand for increased use of
contractor support services is the Federal policy of promoting
effective competition for all goods and services.
It is the objective of this thesis to assist the
contracting officer in understanding the problems inherent
with contractor support services and the difficulties
associated with competing for these services. The research
effort gleaned information from all "walks of life" within
the contractor support services arena. Differing views from
contracting officers, customers, engineers, line and staff
managers, lawyers, policy makers and support service con-
tractors were examined, consolidated, analyzed and presented.
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Through this iterative process, an attempt will "be made to
satisfactorily answer the central research question of this
thesis, "Is it feasible for the contracting officer to
improve the extent of competition of contractor support
services?"
B. SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS
The scope of this effort is limited to the discussions
of contracting out for contractor support services from the
time the contracting officer is aware of the need to contract
out, i.e., after the decision has been made by line manage-
ment to contract out, until award. Contract administration,
while an integral part of the success of contractor support
services, is beyond the scope of this effort as is contracting
for and implementation of the Commercial/Industrial (C/I)
Activities Program under the revised 0MB A-76. Also deleted
from this effort are Federal Contract Research Centers (FCRCs)
and Architect/Engineer (A&E) contracting. These areas offer
fertile ground for future research and study.
For the purposes of this thesis, it is assumed that the
reader has a more than casual understanding of Department of
Defense contracting.
C. METHODOLOGY
Primary research material was collected from discussions
with a myriad of personnel involved in the service con-
tracting arena, ranging from the front line customers of
contractor support services at the field activity level to

the policy makers of the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy. Within the Department of Defense, field trips were
made to the David W. Taylor Naval Research and Development
Center, Bethesda Md. , and the Naval Weapons Laboratory, White
Oak, Md. , for interviews with government engineers, line
management, and contracting officers. Interviews with
policy makers and contracting officers were held at the Naval
Supply Systems Command, the Naval Regional Contracting Office,
Washington, D.C., the Naval Supply Center, Oakland, Ca. , the
Air Force Systems Command, and the Office of Federal Procure-
ment Policy. For a non-DOD flavor, interviews were held
with the Chief Counsel, Office of Personal Management
(formerly the Civil Service Commission) and contracting
officers with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
For a perspective of the contractor, interviews were held with
management personnel from Mantech of New Jersey Corporation
(Washington Corporate Office), and Operations Research, Inc.,
Silver Springs, Md.
Telephone discussions with contracting personnel at the
Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, the Air Force Space
and Missle Systems Organization, the Army Procurement Research
Office, and the Naval Weapons Laboratory, Dahlgren, Va. , also
provided input to this research effort.
Secondary research material included a comprehensive
search of the literature base for applicable studies and
articles. Information was obtained from the library of the
Naval Postgraduate School, the Defense Logistics Information
10

Center, Fort Lee, Virginia, the library of the Federal
Procurement Institute, Washington, D.C. , the Air University,
Maxwell Air Force Base, and the legal library at the Naval
Material Command.
D. FRAMEWORK
10 U.S.C. 5230^ (a) states that:
Purchases of and contracts for property or services...
shall be made by formal advertising in all cases in which
the use of such method is feasible and practicable under the
existing conditions and circumstances.
Source selection is made to the lowest responsive,
responsible bidder. Of course, definitive specifications
are a requirement for use of the IFB method. However, most
contractor support service contractrs are awarded by
negotiation since they often fit one of the seventeen
statutory exemptions from formal advertising. DAR 3-210
explains the circumstances in which it is not practicable to
secure competition by formal advertising and includes:
When it is impossible to draft for a solicitation of bids,
adequate specifications or any other adequately detailed
description of the required supplies or services.
Where a procurement is to be negotiated rather than
formally advertised, appropriate determinations and findings
(D&F) that the procurement falls within one of the 17 ex-
ceptions are required. This negotiated contracting process
is a much more flexible and complex process than the formal
advertising method. Because the process is multi-faceted
and does not result in the selection of the lowest sealed
bid, it requires the exercise of more discretion, judgement
11

and professionalism on the part of contracting officers. The
issues discussed in this thesis pertain to the negotiation
method rather than to the formally advertised method of
contracting.
E. CONTRACTING PROCESS
For the purposes of this thesis the contracting process
includes the following phases:
I Pre -award Phase
a) Planning Phase
b) Source Solicitation Phase
c) Source Evaluation Phase
d) Negotiation/Source Selection Phase
II Award Phase
III Post-award Phase
The thrust of this thesis deals primarily with the
pre-award phase in competing for contractor support services.
Issues discussed in this research effort applicable to the
pre-award phase include a working definition of effective
competition and other terms, the statement of work, evaluation
criteria, and selection of contract types. Also discussed
are the problems associated with the Service Contract Act,
the personal versus nonpersonal services dilemma (including
a brief review of the volatile legal history, of contractor
support services), and contracting for consultants. While
an in-depth discussion of negotiation techniques and com-
petitive ranges are beyond the scope of this effort and will
12

not be addressed, the proper application of the issues examined
herein should be useful negotiation tools. In addition,
these parts of the pre-award phase discussed in this
thesis form the building blocks of the award and post-award
phases.
This thesis will conclude with a chapter on the
normative contracting process as it pertains to contracting
for contractor support services. Applying the concepts
addressed in the preceeding sections, the researcher v/ill
delineate what he perceives the optimal contracting process




A service contract is defined by the Defense Acquisition
Regulation (DAR) 22-101 as a contract which calls directly
for a contractor's time and effort rather than for a concrete
end item. For purposes of this definition, a report is
generally not considered a concrete end item if the primary
purpose of the contract is to obtain the contractors time
and effort and the report is merely incidental. Service con-
tracts are generally found in areas involving the following
categories (DAR 22-101 (b))i
1. Maintenance, overhaul, repair, servicing, rehabilitation,




2. Maintenance, repair, rehabilitation, and modification
of real property.
3. Architect-engineering.
k. Expert and consultant services.
5. The services of DOD-sponsored organizations.
6. Installation of equipment obtained under separate
contract.
7. Operation of Government-owned equipment, facilities,
and systems.
8. Engineering and technical services.
9. Housekeeping and base services.
10. Transportation and related services.
11. Training and education.
12. Medical Services.









22. Research and development.
Categories of Service Contracts




1. Expert and consultant services . These support
services are performed by personnel who are exceptionally
qualified, by education or experience, in a particular
field to perform some specialized service. 0MB 78-11, Guide-
lines for the Use of Consulting Services, further defines
consulting services to mean those services of a purely advisory
nature relating to the governmental functions of agency
administration and management and agency program management.
In view of the growing concern on the use of these types of
services, a separate section in this thesis will be devoted to
this area.
2. Contractor Support Services .
These are services of a white collar, professional
nature involving performance in support of Navy Programs,
such as scientific/technical studies and analysis, test and
evaluation support, budgetary/financial analysis, ADP support,
reliability and maintainability support, cost analysis, and
general management support. The major thrust of this thesis
concerns contractor support services.
3. Commercial or Industrial (C/l) Activities Support
Services .
These are overhead or program support services which are
not essential to the management control of Navy programs. The
major thrust of this effort is in the blue collar area such
as janitorial, transportation, or general services. However,
C/l services may involve efforts similar to those described
above as contractor support services. The major difference
15

between these two types of services is that the C/l
activities support services call for contracting out of entire
functions while CSS involves the contracting out of a specific
effort or task in support of a continuing in-house activity
or capability f 7 s 7^ • ^e applications and procedures
promulgated in the revised 0MB A-76 of March 1979 pertain to
the C/l activities program and are not addressed in this
thesis.
Personal services versus nonpersonal services
All service contracts are further categorized as either
personal services or nonpersonal services. With the exception
of Expert and Consultants employed by personnel officers in
accordance with the Federal Personnel Manual, personal service
contracts are not permitted. Nonpersonal services are an
approved resource that may be used in the accomplishment of
assigned missions by contracting out for contractor support
services (CSS), Commercial or Industrial (C/l) Activities
support services, or consultant services procured by con-
tracting officers in accordance with the DAR. The distinction
between personal and nonpersonal services is not always clear
and many factors are considered in reaching a determination
as to whether a particular service, situation, contract, or
contract performance is personal or nonpersonal in nature.
An indepth discussion of both the legal background and the
personal versus nonpersonal services dilemma will be addressed
later in this thesis. However, in general, a personal service
contract is one in which the contractor or his employees are,
16

in effect, Government employees. This situation occurs when




A. THE GROWTH OF CONTRACTOR SUPPORT SERVICES
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Manpower, Reserve
Affairs and Logistics (M,RA&L), formerly known as the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Installation and Logistics
(ASN (I&L)), expressed interest in the nature, extent, and
policy applicable to the procurement of contractor support
services in support of the Navy's major acquisition programs
[22:2]. The Chief of Naval Material undertook a review of
support service contracts in a sample of projects in the
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) , the Naval Sea Systems
Command (NAVSEA) , and the Naval Electronic Systems Command
(NAVELEX). The initial study reached the following
conclusions £l9*ij:
a) the trend of "support services" has been increasing
dramatically since FY 1963
b) the trend of real procurement (constant dollars)
has been downward while the trend of "support services" has
been upward
c) the dollar volume in FY 1973 was $342 million
while it rose to $812 million in FY 1975. "Support services"
were estimated to be over 19 1 000 man-years of effort in FY
1975.
Subsequent studies, field investigations and analyses
have revealed even higher trends in this area. Deputy Chief
18

of Naval Material (Procurement and Production) , now known as
the Assistant Deputy of Naval Material (ADCNM) for Contracts
and Business Management, Rear Admiral S. J. Evans, SC , USN,
stated, "A more accurate assessment of the extent of total
Navy involvement in contractor support services would he
$1.2 billion in FY 75 vice the earlier finding of $812
million [22:2]." Additionally, RADM Evans pointed out that
more than 50% of the project dollars directed to supporting
activities is contracted out and that project managers
obtain contractor support services at a rate of approximately
three contractor employees for each of their own direct staff
members £22:2]. A later observation by Captain G. R. Henry,
SC, USN, (ADCNM for Contracts & Business Management), extracted
from the Contractor Support Services Review (FY 77 update)
,
indicated still further increases in contractor support
services £36:1J:
a) white collar support services procured by the
hardware Systems Commands (SYSCOMs) have increased 2J%
during the period FY 74 through FY 77.
b) white collar support services procured by the Field
Purchase System have increased 149/5 during the period FY 74
thru FY 77.
The bottom line on contractor support services is that
Naval Material Command (NAVMAT) records support a ten-fold
growth in dollar value during the 1966-1976 timeframe [22: 3].
While some of this increase may be attributable to inflation
and more accurate data collection means, there has been
19

significant growth in the use of all forms of contractor
support services. Future Navy use of contractor support
services may continue at the current high rate or may even
increase. Admiral Alfred J. Whittle, Chief of Naval
Material, forecasted that "...we are going to have to contract
out more work simply because of the personnel ceilings that
are placed upon us each year ([l3:A-ll]. "
B. THE TYPES OF CONTRACTOR SUPPORT SERVICES USED
In addition to surfacing the Navy's increasing dependence
on contractor support services, the aforementioned studies
categorized the types of services involved. The lack of
appropriate in-house expertise has resulted in the procurement
of a broad spectrum of contract support services ranging from
scientific studies and technical support to basic management
support services. At both the project manager and field
activity level, areas where a general lack of functional
expertise exists include f55!l^] !
a) Reliability and Maintainability
b) Integrated Logistics Support
c) Test and Evaluation
d) Cost and Financial Analysis
The range of functions performed through support contract
tasking has covered and continues to cover almost the entire
gamut of what is listed as the government's in-house
responsibility. Representative support services contracted
out include f 55:153 J
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1. Integration of new acquisition concepts, such as
design to cost and life cycle costing, into new and existing
programs.
2. Preparation of internal project documentation
(Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) , Advanced Procurement
Plans (APPs))
3. Development of Specifications
k. Preparation of Briefing or presentation material.
5. Coordinating/expediting government furnished
material and equipment.
6. Coordination of meetings
While most of the individual effort called for is relatively
short term project or program support, concern was voiced by
RADM Evans in the personal services arena and the potential
for organizational conflicts of interest where support
service contractors are involved in multiple projects f 22 :
^
J.
The "Report on the Navy's Involvement with Contractor
Support Services" concluded that the procurement of con-
tractor support services occurs at all levels of the Navy
Command structure. Placing greater reliance on field
activities, such as Navy laboratories, would not reduce the
extent of contracting out--it would merely shift responsibility
for the procurement of services f55sl7J. It is therefore
incumbent on the program or project manager, commanding
officer of field activities, and contracting officers at
all levels to place increased management attention on
21

controlling what the Navy buys (by assuring the validity of
the requirement) and how the Navy buys (by assuring proper
contract placement and administration)
.
C. THE NEED FOR INCREASED COMPETITION FOR CONTRACTOR SUPPORT
SERVICES
The extent and growing reliance on contractor support
services has been well-documented in addition to the
critical need for Government control over many of these
services. But what effect does this have on competition for
contractor support services? Should the Government compete
for these services?
The initial study into the extent of Navy involvement of
"support services" reported that the top 137 contractors
($500K or more in contractor support services in any one year
between 1973 and 1975) had been increasing their share of
these services from 90f* in FY73 to 9^-5^ in FY75- "This
indicates 'inside track* situations and sole source versus
competitive procurements'T 19 si} • ^n "the Washington D.C.
area, 6 contractors accounted for 50% of total contractor
support dollars in FY 75 f 55*93* These Navy findings appeared
during the same time period when the Washington Star reported
that Representative Les Aspin (D-Wis) said, "there has been
a steady decline in the competitive awarding of defense
contracts in the last five years", decreasing from 35.8% in
1971 to J0% in 1975 and that sole source contracts increased
from 39. 7/5 to 1+5.8% during this five year period [80].
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The NAVMAT studies and reports on the involvement of the
Navy in contract support services revealed that the incidence
of competition was low and that the effectiveness of com-
petitive efforts was weak. RADM Evans summarized this
problem area of contractor support services [_22:^]:
In procuring services of this nature the product
sought is dependent upon the capabilities and experience
of company employees and to some degree corporate memory.
It is therefore difficult to make meaningful proposal
evaluations, particularly of companies capabilities, when
many firms can hire requisite expertise after contract
award from among the growing consultant population of
former military/civil service employees... Once an initial
contract is awarded, the relationship established tends to
perpetuate itself on a sole source basis.
In summary, preliminary research indicates that the use
of contractor support services is increasing and, at the
same time, the incidence of competition for these services
is declining. In light of the lack of in-house government
expertise coupled with staffing constraints, the project
manager and contracting officer have few alternatives but to
increase the use of contractor support services. The project
manager and the contracting officer must ensure that proper
justification exists for the use of these services. Control
over the use of these services and the contracting process
itself must be exercised. Through the joint efforts of the
project manager and particularly the contracting officer,
the downward trend in competing for contractor support
services can be reversed.
It is the intent of this thesis to propose actions that
might aid the contracting officer in reversing this downward
23

trend. With proper application of the elements discussed
herein, it is suggested that the professional contracting
officer can indeed increase competition of contractor support
services.
D. DEFINITION OF COMPETITION
1. Price vs. Technical Corn-petition
Before proceeding with a discussion and analysis of
the research question of this thesis, i.e., "Is it feasible to
improve the extent of competition of white collar professional
contractor support services contracts?", it is necessary to
understand and define the concept of competition. The
Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR) 3-80?. 1 provides the
following guidance on price competition:
Price competition exists if offers are solicited and
(i) at least two responsible offerors (ii) who can satisfy
the purchaser's (e.g., the Government's) requirements (iii)
independently contend for a contract to be awarded to the
responsive and responsible offeror submitting priced offers
responsive to the expressed requirements of the solicitation.
To this understanding of price competition, the
contracting officer must consider the concept of technical
competition, applicable when award is to be based upon
technical and other factors in addition to price or cost.
White collar contractor support services are typically
characterized by technical competition. Examples are:
Research and Development (R&D) studies, concept definition
activities, alternative design efforts, engineering support
services, management support analyses or recommendations.
When buying value, pushing the state-of-the-art or purchasing
2k

a contractor's best level-of -effort, the Government may be
unable to state its minimum need and therefore competition,
according to the Federal Acquisition Act, 5-5. "insures the
government of alternative offers that provide a range of
concept design, performance, price, total cost, service,
and delivery." In addition to understanding the nuances of
price versus technical competition, the contracting officer
must also be able to distinguish between the economist's
concept of "perfect competition" and the concept of effective
competition in order to formulate an optimum competitive
strategy for a given requirement.
2. Perfect Competition vs. Effective Competition
The economist's definition of perfect competition is
characterized by a perfectly competitive market based on four
conditions [" 35 : 937 :
a) There are numerous buyers and sellers such that
no one buyer or seller can materially influence the total
market conditions of demand, supply or price.
b) The commodities and services being sold and bought
are homogeneous.
c) There are no restrictions on the entry or exit
of firms from the market.
d) All buyers and sellers have perfect knowledge of
the product or services being sold and the prices of those
transactions.
In the defense market today, the government has
created a monopsonsitic market characterized by a single
25

buyer and several sellers thereby influencing total market
conditions of demand, supply and price. Restrictions exist
to market entry, products and services offered are not
identical, and all sellers (as well as the Government) do
not have perfect knowledge. Thus, conditions of perfect
competition are not encountered. However, the contracting
officer may create conditions conducive to effective com-
petition. Effective competition is said to exist when the
expected value of the benefits to be derived from competition
exceed the expected costs of creating competition, as measured
in monetary and/or non-monetary terms.
The proposed Federal Acquisition Act (S.5)
characterizes effective competition by:
a) timely availability to prospective sellers of
information required to respond to agency needs;
b) independence of action by buyer and seller;
c) efforts of two or more sellers, acting independently
of each other, to respond to an agency need by creating,
developing, demonstrating or offering products or services
which best meet the need as a desired function to be per-
formed, performance or physical requirements to be met,
or some combination of these;
d) absence of bias or favoritism in the solicitation,
evaluation, and award of contracts.
It is the contracting officer's responsibility to rely
on and promote effective competition. Along v/ith the definition
of effective competition, the contracting officer should be
aware of some of the factors that make competition less
desirable than single source or sole source contracting to
the contractor and industry.
26

J. Roland Fox raises some issues that make
non-competitive procurements preferable to competitive pro-
curements £25 : 256 J. The first issue, echoed by both
contractor management and DOD contract customers, is that
competition requires more time and effort than noncompetitive
contracting. Care must be exercised in developing a thorough
statement of work, a Request for Proposal (RFP) , and
evaluation criteria to ensure that each offeror's proposal
is evaluated on the same basis. The planning, implementation
and accomplishment of this process may add months to the
procurement administrative lead time. Although competition
may require significant effort, it is also true that con-
siderable time and effort may be required to properly
document the sole source justification for a noncompetitive
procurement. Under Cost Principles, in accordance with DAR
Section XV, noncompetitive contract actions over $100,000
require an in-depth audit by the Defense Contract Audit
Agency (DCAA) . This is time consuming, as are the require-
ments for a Determination and Finding (D&F) and preparation
by the customer and contract negotiator for an appearance
before the Contract Review Board (CR3)
.
A proper CRB requires clear and convincing evidence
that a sole source procurement is in the best interests of
the Government. The reluctance of a CRB to "rubber stamp"
approval of sole source procurements forces the customer to
think "competitive procurement" in the early planning stages
of his requirement. Nonetheless, cooperative participation
27

by all parties involved can reduce the time and red tape
involved and the end result of the competitive process can
justify the increase, if any, in time and red tape.
Second, Fox advances that competition increases the
likelihood of protests and disputes from one or more con-
tracts, noting (a) that losing contractors often content
that the Government gave special information to the winning
contractor, and (b) that contracting officers must take
particular care to document and justify each decision made
in a competitive procurement [25:257].
The researcher posits that this argument against
competition seems weak because just as many protests or
disputes may arise from awarding a contract on a "sole
source" basis based upon insufficient justification. In a
properly handled competitive award, all offerors receive the
same information. Indeed, the Code of Ethics and Professional
Responsibility for Professional Contracts Managers states
that each Certified Professional Contract Manager must
maintain his or her integrity and objectivity at all times
so as to exercise competent and independent professional
judgement. And in regard to Fox's latter point, this same
Code of Ethics demands that each contracting officer
recognize that contracts are matters of public interest and
public record and, therefore, shall conduct his or her
management activities so that they can be fully substantiated
and properly supported [5:10J.
28

Thirdly, ^ox's suggestion that competitive
procurement is less desirable than single source procurement
appears to be even to the researcher. He states that
competition frequently disrupts long-established relation-
ships between Government and industry personnel who have
worked together on the procurement of a particular item
Q25 * 257? • i'ot only does this run counter to the fore-
mentioned Code of Ethics, but also the principle of an
"arm's length" relationship between the government and
contractor required for the integrity, fairness, objectivity,
and absence of bias or favoritism in the procurement
process.
Zemansky is a strong advocate of competition for
architectural, engineering and consulting firms that render
professional services. In discussing the pro's and cons of
competitive procurement, Zemansky developed several positions
of which the contracting officer should be aware. Some of
these positions are synopsized below and expanded upon by
the researcher.
CON: Competition often results in awards to other than
the "best qualified" firm.
PRO: The term "best qualified" requires definition [ S 2 : 7J
.
The researcher has observed that the determination of
who is the best qualified should be made by a sole selection
board or the contracting officer based on clearly delineated
evaluation criterion in tandum with a well-written statement
of work and RFP.
29

CON: The preparation of competitive proposals would
significantly increase costs for both buyer and seller
thereby negating any benefits that may be obtained through
the competitive process.
PRO: The results of competition are found to decrease
cost between 15-25^ for the buyer. Proposal costs are
generally included in the normal costs of doing business
and suppliers of professional services should not be
immune from the rigorous discipline of the marketplace£82:8]
.
CON: Selection influenced on price often leads to the
possible employment of inexperienced personnel or
"subprofessionals , " instead of first-line personnel for
some work.
PRO: These statements tend to reflect a lack of integrity
of the "professionals" guilty of what might be unethical
practices £82:8}.
The researcher would add that the Government should
consider the technical/cost trade off in determining the
evaluation factors. Requests for proposals requiring a high
degree of professional expertise should be awarded on a
different basis than those requiring less expertise. The
former should be awarded on a high technical/cost trade off
(say 90/10) with a personnel substitution clause. The latter
should be awarded on a lower technical/cost trade off (say
50/50) or award could be based on that qualified offeror who
submits the lowest price.
CON: At the outset... a detailed prospectus (specification
or SOW) cannot be prepared to define the exact nature and
scope of the services to be performed since professional
services involve many intangibles such as technical knowl-
edge, judgement, skill and decision making.
30

PRO: These statements can, to some extent, be obviated
by a myriad of tools available to the contracting
officer [82:8].
Included are, performance specifications, a conclusive
statement of work, a well-written request for proposal
(RFP) , meaningful evaluation criteria, effective contract
planning, and selection of the proper contract type.
CON: No matter what the system, means of circumventing
the process will always be found by the unscrupulous.
PRO: Despite weakness in the system, competitive bidding
(and negotiation) still provides the best safeguard
against profligacy and corruption. The lack of bidding
rules officially opens up the opportunity to collusion
between contractors, overpayment for shoddy products or
"kick backs" [81 :5]«
Zemansky concludes that, without delving into a
detailed analysis of numerous reasons for opposition to
competition found in his research, there is not one reason
for non-competitive procurement that cannot be accommodated
in a sound, competitive, and if necessary, time compressed
contractual process [83:8^].
Competition is the basic fundamental cornerstone of
the procurement process. Hitch and McKean identified the
importance of competitive contracting in i960 [38:232]:
. . . .Nothing spurs a contractor as effectly as knowledge
that his performance will be compared directly with that
of a rival or rivals, with appropriate rewards and penalties-
either in the short run (by the terms of the current con-





Competition goes a long way to ensure that the
final price is fair and reasonable to both the buyer and
seller. However, in contracting for contractor support
services, the importance of innovation, creativity, related
experience and the individual qualifications of contractor
personnel should not be overlooked. For many requirements
it is impossible to specifically identify the end products.
This lack of product identity requires a different form of




III. WHAT PROBLEMS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH COMPETING FOR
CONTRACTOR SUPPORT SERVICES?
A. STATEMENT OF WORK
The Statement of Work (SOW) , scope of work, technical
requirement or specification (design or performance) are
terms used to state Government requirements. The SOW is the
foundation of the RFP itself and the understanding of the
SOW should be an integral part of the evaluation criteria.
In source selection, each plays a major role.
The SOW describes in detail the end item, task to be
performed, or level-of-effort to be exerted in the performance
of the task or job. It consists of:
a) expressing the contract-desired output in clear,
simple, concise and legally enforceable terms.
b) using a format that presents the specified tasks or
requirements in an easily understood manner.
c) determining what exhibits will help convey to the
contractor the job that needs to be done fl:23j«
Also included in the SOW is the technical and management
data applicable to the contract. Industry has alleged that
some work statements have become so complex that the con-
tractor cannot fully comprehend all the requirements the
Government desires. However, if the SOW is not sufficiently
comprehensive, some contractors may not submit offers because
of uncertainty regarding the tasks involved, or conversely,
feel inhibited by the requirement because the SOW is too
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restrictive L68:2J. Additionally, especially with respect
to contracting for white collar support services, when the
Government is attempting to buy the height level of quality,
vague specifications and poorly defined evaluation criteria
have increased (a) disputes, protests, and claims due to
misinterpretation of requirements, and (b) unsatisfactory
contractor performance Q34:6j. A poorly written SOW may
result in needless delays and extra administrative effort
during the source selection process. Delays may also be
experienced in communication required to clairfy an ambiguous
SOW. An otherwise qualified contractor could be disqualified
from the selection process due to inadequate technical
responses to an incomplete SOW. Costly contingency allowances
or low quality and inventive proposals may also be the
unintentional results ["63: 2!.
An incomplete SOW may also lead to unintentional "buying
in" as the contractor may not fully comprehend the extent of
the Government's requirement. The contracting officer usually
finds this out during the performance of the contract or when
the final task or level-of-effort is delivered below the
Government's expectation and requirement. The Contracting
Officer is forced with either accepting a lower level-of-
effort or issuing a modification clarifying the SOW.
Rarely has a termination for convenience or termination
for default been upheld in professional service contracting.
The doctrine of "contra proferentem" means that inter-
pretations concerning ambiguous specifications and statements
3^

of work will be held against the writer of the specifications
(generally the Government). The drafter of the Statement of
Work must ensure that it reads well, is logical and can
effectively communicate the needs of the Government to the
contractor. The requirements for technical or engineering
studies often specify a level-of-effort to be attained and
many words used to describe the Statement of Work do not
have exact meanings. The use of abstract words or concepts
should be defined in conjunction v/ith examples, illustrations,
or definitions that further amplify what is required. "Shall",
"will", "any", "either", "and for", and the misuse of pro-
nouns should be avoided. Various shades of meaning may be
conveyed by the choice of words. In order to answer the
questions what are the work requirements? or what are the
words that express the need explicitly?, the Military
Handbook on the Preparation of Statement of Work (SOW)
defines the following work words to aid in identifying the
objective need (the what, why, and application) \J\-6\k-l\.
Analyze (solve by analysis)
Calculate (find out by computation)
Compare (find out likeness or difference)
Determine (resolve; settle; decide)
Examine (look at closely; test quality of)
Extract (take out; deduce, select)
Evaluate (find or fix the value of)
Interpret (explain the meaning of)
Organize (integrate, arrange in a coherent unit)
Resolve (reduce by analysis, clean up)
Recommend (advise, attract favor of)
Review (inspection, examination or evaluation)
Realizing the importance of the effort in developing a
Statement of Work (i.e., the technical or functional area,
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the contracting office, and manpower and/or management
engineering) , the Department of Defence (DOD) has a
comprehensive guide to the preparation of conclusive SOW's
for application to any of the R&D phases as well as the
production phase of material acquisitions. It also covers
the SOW preparation for nonpersonal service contracts
How long should a Statement of Work be? How detailed?
How can the contracting officer determine the optimum
effectiveness of the SOW when it is often written in tech-
nical language addressing the requirements of technical
personnel? How can the contracting officer tell if the SOW
was written around the known capabilities of a certain con-
tractor thus, under the guise of competition, ensuring sole
source to the contractor the requirements personnel desired?
(At a major Navy Laboratory, one SOW submitted to the con-
tracting officer was taken verbatem from an engineering
services company marketing brochure! [.103] ) The answer lies
with the professionalism and expertise of the contracting
officer and the negotiator assigned to the requirement.
While some SOW's are so brief that they do not even approach
the "precision of ambiguity," [96J others are so complex that
they promote "fictitious competition"
^9 3J . Both extremes
may lead to problems addressed earlier. A happy medium must
be reached, otherwise the foundation of the acquisition and
contracting process is breached.
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This researcher perceives that the increased contracting
out for professional and technical services coupled v/ith
personnel ceiling reductions has lead to a new generation
of engineers and technical personnel in the government civil
service. Lacking the time and resources to work as an
engineer or expert in their chosen field, they have been
forced to become Statement of Work writers, graders of
evaluation criteria, and contract administrators. The
previous attitude of "I don't want to be bothered with writing
a SOW" or "Everybody knows we engineers can't write" is being
changed by necessity. The contracting community is enhanced
by this evolution. However, many Navy laboratories and
agencies are losing core capabilities and control over the
conduct of their programs and mission as well as losing
skilled Government personnel to the private sector.
In summary, a clear, concise, and conclusive SOW is
essential to effective contracting. It describes in detail
the end item, level of effort or task to be performed, and
includes the technical and management information necessary
for effective competition and successful contract performance.
The preparation of a conclusive SOW is a team effort between
user, customer, and contracting officer that should commence
as early as possible in the contracting process.
B. EVALUATION FACTORS
As important as the Statement of Work, the terms of the
competition are crucial in the source selection process and
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should be unambiguously defined. If award is to be made on .
factors other than price, the solicitation must include
evaluation factors. DAR 3 _ 501(b) state that:
When an award is to be based upon technical and other
factors in addition to price or cost, the solicitation
shall clearly inform offerors of (A) the significant
evaluation factors, and (B) the relative order of
importance the government attaches to price and all such
other factors.
General considerations of the evaluation process usually
consist of technical, management and cost areas. The
contracting officer should additionally take into account
past performance, level of experience and expertise, and
personnel resources to perform the tasks set forth in the
RFP. For example, an Air Force RFP for Engineering Support
Services included four technical criteria used in evaluating
the technical proposal to determine the offeror's ability to
meet the requirements as stated in the Statement of Work
(SOW)
.
Criteria 1, 2, and 3 were of equal importance while
criterion h was of lesser importance:
Criteria 1: Understanding the objectives, requirements
and overall conditions.
Criteria 2: Soundness of technical approach.
Criteria 3 ! Technical experience, capability and
performance history.
Criteria kx Compliance with the instructions and
requirements of this solicitation £39].
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To illustrate the complexity of the process, the technical
area was further divided into eight sub-factors with importance
of the sub-factors listed in descending order: configuration/
interface management, Statement of Work review, software
quality support, reliability support, materials and process
control support, system safety monitoring, personnel sub-
system support, and manufacturing and production coordination.
Each of these sub-factors in turn had at least four factors.
Similar criteria and format followed for management and cost
areas. Research on DOD and NASA evaluation criteria found
similar complexities, including design and program planning
approachs, approachs to requirements analysis and approachs
to trade-offs/methodology. However, NASA evaluated proposals
with respect to four groups of factors: mission suitability
factors, cost factors, experience and past performance and
other factors (financial conditions, small business, etc.
J
50 : 2-lJ ) Evaluation criteria may also be based upon the
resumes of personnel offered by the contractor. Resumes
should show the education and experience of the available
personnel and the labor category outlined in the SOW to which
the individual will be assigned. The reason for this is
twofold: the competing offeror with the most qualified
personnel should have a competitive advantage and the
government's definition of a project engineer, senior or
junior engineer might differ from the offeror's definition.
Hence the evaluation criteria can be a substantive part
of the RFP. The more technical or complex the requirement,
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the more complex and lengthy the evaluation criteria may-
become . Evaluation criteria are never identical. Each
procurement action has a separate and distinct set of
evaluation criteria. In a recent Contract Management
article, 'Walter McClelland stated that we must guard against
over-complicating the evaluation process [45:l6j. To achieve
this we must have a complete and comprehensive SOW and
evaluation factors and criteria. But in this latter regard,
the DAR 3-501 (b) inhibits the effectiveness of the contracting
process: "Numerical weights, which may be employed in the
evaluation of proposals, shall not be disclosed in solicitation."
Both the government and the contractor benefit by a
well-written RFP, however, without knowledge of the numerical
weights, several problem areas can arise. For example:
1. The contractor must guess what the Government wants.
This encourages informal communication lines between the
Government's technical people and the contractor which might
result in one company acquiring a competitive edge.
2. Informal communication breeds familiarity that could
lead to an illegal personnel services situation.
3. By knowing v/hat the government intended, it gives
an incumbent contractor a competitive advantage as does the
company who has had prior dealings with the particular
procuring office.
k. Even a winner by competition could be overcharging
the government due to overloading the labor categories, i.e.,
not knowing the numerical weights and to make their technical
ho

proposal score higher, the contractor offered a senior
engineer vice a junior engineer, when the work could be
performed by a junior engineer.
5. With a lack of numerical weights, contracting
officers must rely more on narrative language and definitions
that vary from agency to agency or activity to activity.
Here again an incumbent or an offeror with experience with
the agency or activity has a competitive edge.
6. All of these factors may lead to protests or disputes.
Femino and Smail conclude that simply by providing
numerical weights, contracting officers would insure that the
most accurate, intelligent and realistic competition is
available. Offerors could focus their attention and resources
precisely in those areas most critical to the needs of the
Government and would reduce inconsistency, uncertainty, and
enhance openess and public confidence in the procurement
process [^24: 2l] .
Indeed, the more salient information the Government can
provide in the RFP, the better off both the contractor and
the Government will be. Even if technical/cost trade-off
information could be divulged, competition and contract
performance would be enhanced. Franc V/ertheimer, president
of a successful engineering services contractor, stated fll5l:
The more I know up front, the better job I can do of
responding to the government's needs. The technical/cost
tradeoff is a gauge. I'll offer a top engineer on a 90/10
trade off and a less experienced engineer on a 75/25
trade off. 3y the same token, on pushing the state-of-the-
art on R&D contracts, I'll offer my best talent while on




But some lawyers are reluctant to divulge even this
simplest of information in an RFP to offers due to nebulous
guidance. They won't let us say an 80/20 technical trade-
off but they will let us say 5 to 1," stated one Government
contracting officer [103}.
The Commission on Government Procurement recommended a
change in the law concerning competitive procurements to
require the disclosure of evaluation criteria and their
relative weights [72:22]. This recommendation is currently
in Section 302 of the draft of the Federal Acquisition Reform
Act (S.5):
Each solicitation shall include both the evaluation
methodology and the relative importance of all significant
factors to be used during competitive evaluation and for
final selection.
Indeed, as echoed by Femino and Smail, the Commission on
Government Procurement concluded that the disclosure of
relative weights and evaluation factors would create greater
public confidence in the procurement process, motivate
procuring agencies to give greater attention to definitive
Statements of Work and what they require of contractors, and
facilitate the preparation of more responsive proposals [71:25].
In summary, the Statement of Work and its parent Request
for Proposal (RFP) must be understandable--it must be able
to get across to offerors what the Government needs. To
assist in this process, the RFP must present an integrated
package to the offerors. The SOW is only one vital cog of
the RFP. The instructions for preparation of the proposal,
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the technical content of the proposal, and discussion of
evaluation factors and criteria are equally essential
cogs [>3>30].
C. COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES OF INCUMBENTS
Although the disclosure of relative weights and
evaluation factors to offerors would aid in the source
selection process and increase competition for reasons
addressed previously, the problem of how much weight to assign
past performance continues to plague contracting officers.
DAR 1-903.1 states that:
"...the contracting officer should consider. .. technical
competence. . .and past performance in adhering to contract
requirement, weighing each factor in accordance with the
requirement of the particular procurement."
Currently, no systematic program exists for recording,
storing or analyzing contract performance of service
contracts [37:58]« The only means of obtaining such infor-
mation is from the RFP; which, because of its source, is
biased at best. The contracting officer must contact the
activities or agencies that were recipients of the offeror's
services for accurate information.
In response to the need for a structured program to
measure and weight contractor past performance, M. A. Nassr
proposes a simplified, fact-oriented data system broken down
into four areas: (l) administrative, (2) cost, (3) schedule,
and (4) performance £49:10-12]. While the intent of this
DOD-wide proposal is commendable, its benefit to the
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researcher is questionable. The effort required by contracting
personnel to compile, record, and distribute such information
would be an added administrative burden.
With undue emphasis on past performance, a new contractor
is at a competitive disadvantage--f irst, because he is
unknown and secondly, because of a comprehensive data bank
on experience contractors with whom the new company competes.
This contradicts the policy contained in the proposed
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) "to facilitate the
competitive entry of new and small sellers." Emphasis on
past performance may also restrict the growth of competition
in existing markets. Knowing that they would not be rated
on past performance or on a product or service they had not
provided previously, a growing contractor has no incentive
to diversify and expand into new markets. Frequently, the
current contractor whose performance has been satisfactory
enjoys a favorable relationship with the customer who prefers
a continuing relationship with him. This favorable relation-
ship and familiarity could result in the contractor receiving
unduly high grades in Nassr's past performance criteria.
Satisfactory contractors receiving outstanding marks could
progress even higher. Thus, there would be little
discrimination between a top performer and a satisfactory
performer--the result being that only those contractors
failing completely to perform would receive low marks.
(Parenthetically, this type of information on this latter
point is found in the current Joint Consolidated List of
Debarred Ineligible and Suspended Contractors.)

The effectiveness of Nassr's past performance grading
criteria would further be eroded by a recent GAO decision.
Here, the contracting officer rated performance of the
offerors in the most recent years as either "satisfactory",
"adequate", or "unsatisfactory." The unsuccessful offeror
alleged that the contracting office precluded the offeror's
most recent experience for the 7-month period between the
date of the last evaluation and the proposal submission
date fziik-7 and 31J. Thus, any consolidated D0D--wide
past performance grading system would be obsolete unless
the proposal submission date happened to coincide with the
most current performance evaluation grades.
The performing contractor enjoys a competitive advantage
even v/ithout increased emphasis on past performance. GAO
has repeatedly held that the contracting officer has no
duty to neutralize the incumbent contractor's competitive
advantage X 30j- The only basis for favoring an unsuccessful
offeror's protest, would be where "the competitive advantage
enjoyed by a particular firm would be the result of a
preference or unfair action by the Government" [291. As
will be seen later in this thesis, the Service Contract Act
and Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) policy on
preventing "wage busting" for professionals further protects
the contractor from competitors. The satisfactory incumbent
is assured of the successor contract by offering the services
as requested in the next RFF at the current rate. By law
^5

and policy, no offeror can successfully underbid the current
contractor. Furthermore, who would have more "hands on"
experience and understanding of the successor RFP?
Personal or employee experience and qualifications is
often one of .the highest-ranked evaluation criterion in
service contracts usually outweighing corporate experience.
The offeror with personnel presently employed by the offeror
on a full-time basis, i.e., the incumbent, will normally
receive a higher mark in the evaluation process than an
offeror who proposes an individual not currently under the
offeror's employ on a full time basis. In fact, some RFP '
s
have gone as far as stating that submission of resumes of
individuals not currently employed by, not under subcontract
to the offeror, or with whom the offeror does not have a
bona fide employment contract, may be cause for the rejection
of the offer V* 57j • This is done to prevent a "body shop"
from receiving award and to protect the Government against
the vicissitudes and uncertainty inherent in "body shops".
(A body shop is the unofficial term given to those services
contractors who, at time of solicitation and proposal
preparation, do not have employment agreements with proposed
service employees tlOJQ.) This maybe viewed by many small
business specialists as restricting competition to only
those large businesses with large staffs and high overhead
costs sufficient to retain technical expertise between
contracts. Conversely, some solicitations may ask for
resumes requiring only that those persons be employed by the

time of award. This often results in a situation where the
employee offered by a contractor is performing as an
employee of the incumbent contractor. Hence, the company
name changes but the person actually performing the work
remains unchanged.
The contractor's position affords him other advantages
in competing for follow-on contracts. He may acquire pro-
priety data on the instant contract that may put him in a
sole source position on the follow-on requirement. Even if
the Government included a data rights or patent data rights
clause in the instant contract, the contractor might withhold
certain data that would give him an advantage in a competitive
follow-on procurement. The incumbent contractor is also in
a favorable position to receive informal information and
communication from the technical personnel concerning funding
constraints, government estimates, knowledge of solicitations
before they are synopsized enabling them to have a longer time
period for proposal preparation, and other useful management
information. Informal communication on government technical
needs may result in the incumbent submitting a "unsolicited
proposal" that is in reality not an original innovative idea
from the contractor but a formalization of governments own
needs. These informally solicited proposals are often
submitted by former government engineers who have terminated
or retired from the Civil Service and now have their own
companies or work as employees of firms they previously
dealt with as government personnel [8^ J.
h7

The contracting officer must evaluate past performance
in competing for professional support services in light of
each requirement. However, undue emphasis should not be
placed on past performance. The major concern in selecting
a contractor, determines Shnitzer, should he the quality of
his offer, not of his background. The successful offeror
should be responsible, "but the focus in making the selection
should be on the merits of the offer, not those of the
offeror" [75' 21 ]• In the evaluation of past performance,
the contracting officer should be cognizant that the incum-
bent contractor does in fact enjoy a competitive advantage
and should recognize the need of an "arms length" relationship
between the government's contracting and technical personnel
and the incumbent contractor.
D. LEGAL BACKGROUND AND GASES
A review of the landmark decisions and opinions should
prove to be beneficial to the contracting officer in an
understanding of the personal vs. non personal services
dilemma, an integral part of contractor support services.
The reliance on subjectivity and the pack of definitive
rules in the personal vs. non personal services area has
resulted in legal decisions determining the legal aspects
of service contracts.
The Fuchu Case in 1964 involved a contract with the
Capehart Corporation to furnish technicians to work at the
Fuchu Air Force Base in Japan. The Civil Service Commission's
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General Counsel, in a ruling with which the GAO concurred,
held that an individual is considered to be a Federal
employee when the individual is [60:27J:
(1) engaged in performance of a Federal function
under authority of an act of Congress or an Executive
order.
(2) appointed in the Civil Service by a Federal
Officer or employee,
(3) subject to the supervision and direction of a
Federal Officer or employer.
If the individuals performing the work meet one of the
above criteria, the work should not be contracted out but
should be performed in-house by Federal employees.
In June 196?. a landmark opinion was rendered that
expanded the principles set forth by the Fuchu Opinion.
FPM Letter No. 300-8 described the contracts as follows [2oJ:
The Goddard contracts found to violate the personnel laws
were "cost-plus-award fee" contracts for scientific, engin-
eering, design, and fabrication services to be provided
on-site at Goddard. The contracts called for a specified
number of "direct-labor man years" to be provided by the
contractor with "average monthly rates of effort" specified.
"Key personnel," mainly contractor supervisors, were named
in the contract and had to meet the approval of Goddard
officials and could not be reassigned or transferred with-
out permission of the agency. The "statement of work" in
the contracts was general in nature and the contracts were
performed by the agency ordering individual tasks to be
done by the contractor. The contractor employees performed
on-site, as integral adjuncts of Goddard organizational
units. Many had worked in the same jobs for a number of
years and for other than the current contractor. The facts
established that these employees were (l) engaged in the
performance of a Federal function; (2) supervised and
directed on the job by Federal employees and officials;
(3) occupying Federal positions which Goddard had created
in connection with the contract operation; and (k)
"appointed" either by Goddard officials or by the con-
tractor, in effect exercising the power of appointment,
which could not lawfully be delegated to a private company.
li-O,

In October of 1967, the General Counsel of the Civil
Service Commission, Mr. Lee Perllerzi, rendered a forty-page
opinion, known as the Perllerzi opinion, that found these
contracts to create an employer-employee relationship between
the Government and the contractors employees. He concluded
that these contracts and "all others like them are prescribed
unless an agency passes a specific exception from the per-
sonnel laws to procure personnel services by contract £26J.
"
These conclusions were included in PPM 300-12 expanding
the criteria for determining when a contract for support
services is illegal. These six elements should not be
looked at separately but should be viewed on the basis of the
overall substance of the contract operations [27J
:
1. Performance on-site.
2. Principal tools and equipment furnished by the
Government.
3. Services are applied directly to integral effort of
agencies or an organizational subpart in furtherance
of assigned function or mission.
k. Comparable services, meeting comparable needs, are
performed in the same or similar agencies using civil
service personnel.
5. The need for the type of service provided can reasonably
be expected to last beyond one year.
6. The inherent nature of the service, or the manner in
which it is provided reasonably requires directly or
indirectly, Government direction or supervision of
contractor employees in order:
To adequately protect the Government's interest, or
To retain control of the function involved, or
To retain full personal responsibility for the




Shortly after the Pellerzi Opinion in 1967, AFGE
protested the removal of Civil Service personnel at the
Marshall Space Flight Center when service contractor per-
sonnel were performing those functions performed by the
RIFed (Reduction in Force) Government personnel. The U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia held that 22
of 32 contracts violated the Pellerzi standards as applied
by the court and were therefore null and void, the court
directed NASA to terminate the contracts and retroactively
reinstate the Civil Service personnel who had been dis-
placed f 3 : ^+0l . Although many factors were involved,
government supervision was the most critical test [J52:1J
There are several interesting aspects to the Lodge 1358
case, First, the nine years between the court case being
filed by the AFGE and the summary judgement shows the con-
fusion and lack of direction inherent in whether services
rendered by contractors are personal or nonpersonal in
nature. However, the government's defense of Lodge I858
forced it to examine its contracting-out policy and
demonstrated the need to define contracting-out policies.




The second interesting aspect of this case is that the
contracts that were found to be nonpersonal and proper
were photo repair, custodial, laundry, and refuse collection.
These were all blue collar efforts that could be readily
identified, segregated and operated as separate functions
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independent of Government supervision. Conversely, the
white collar efforts, such as engineering support for
design, test evaluation, analysis, document preparation,
and related tasks were found to be personal in nature and
therefore illegal. While the segregated blue collar efforts
could be adequately specified in the statement of work(s)
the white collar effort was generally program support and
not identified or segregated as a separate function. The
District Court found that this type of support effort cannot
operate independently of Government supervision [_6:1J.
The Court considered the following as factors in
establishing an improper employer-employee relationship
[6,lj.
(i) detailed reporting requirements
(ii) prior approval of a staffing plan, personnel
policies and changes of key personnel by the contracting
officer
(iii) prior approval of labor rate; and salaries by the
contracting officer
(iv) contractor reimbursement only upon approval of
contracting officer
(v) Government determination of what constitutes
acceptable work
(vi) control of work by the issuance of schedule orders,
supplemented by technical direction, and monitored by
technical representatives
(vii) even where only the R?P required submission of data
relating to the number and kinds of positions, detailed
personnel qualifications and experience data, and qualifying
policies and procedures, it was found that such action
allowed the Government to improperly direct, influence, or
control the number, kinds, qualifications, sources, and
organization of the contractor's employees.
To the researcher, the factors considered by the court
in establishing an improper employee-employer relationship
coupled with the finding that white collar program support
type efforts could not by their very nature operate
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independently of Government supervision, would have seriously-
hampered the Government's efforts in contracting out to
support its missions.
On March 20, 1978, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the District
Court's ruling, finding that the District Court applied an
"overly broad standard" in determining whether an employer-
employee relationship existed QHt^^J. While the Government
gave orders for specific services and retained the right to
reject the finished product or result, the Government did
not exercise the degree of supervision necessary to convert
the contractor's employees into Government employees.
Thus, in dealing with the legal aspects of contractor
support services, and consultants ri5:A-llj, the contracting
officer is faced with a volatile, dynamic and everchanging
challenge. He/she must have an understanding of past
contract law and work closely with legal counsel to keep
current on the most recent decisions, findings and opinions
concerning contracting support services and the personal
vs. non personal services dilemma.
S. PERSONAL VS N0NPERS0NAL SERVICES DILEMMA
Many situations will arise where the Government does not
want to hire people to provide goods or services, yet the
work or service required is essentially labor. The Govern-
ment may obtain nonpersonal services by contract providing
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that r.7^i s d) "^e contract itself asks for an end item
and is the primary purpose of the contract, and (2) the
contract must be written and administered in such a way
that control and supervision over the work and discretion
to the techniques which will he used remain solely with the
contractor. Subjectivity and the use of judgement complicate
the personal vs nonpersonal services dilemma.
There are no definitive rules for determining whether
services are personal or nonpersonal. There are many
factors involved and determination can only be the result of
balancing all the factors in accordance with their relative
importance pertaining to a particular case of situation.
DAR 22-1-2.2 contains factors for consideration which in-
clude the nature of the work, contractual provisions
concerning the contractor's employees, other provisions of
the contract such as whether the services can properly be
defined as an end product or specific task, and the admin-
istration of the contract. While there is normally not one
factor that distinguishes a legitimate nonpersonal service
contract from a personal and illegal service contract, a
service contract is personal and illegal when the relationship
between the Government and the contractor's personnel is
that of employer and employee, i.e., when the "master-servant"
relationship exists. Most controversies in the personal vs
nonpersonal services area result not from the way the contract
is written but from the way it is administered F20:loJ.
While the problems of contract administration of contractor

support services are beyond the scope of this study, the
contracting officer should be aware of the requirement for
professional contract administration in the planning and
pre-award phases, including the training of users of
contractor services, technical, engineering and management
personnel.
P. THE SERVICE CONTRACT ACT
The Service Contract Act of 19^5 was written to bridge
the gap left by the Davis-Bacon Act (construction contracts)
and the Walsh-Healey Public Contract Act (supply contract)
[ll:A-7l. The act covers "every contract entered into
by the United States or the District of Columbia in excess
of $2,500... the principal purpose of which is to furnish
services in the United States through the use of service
employees [7 8l." The act defined service employees as:
guards, watchmen, and any person engaged in a recognized
trade or craft, or other skilled semi-skilled, or skilled
manual labor occupations. It also stated that the contractor
must pay his employees the prevailing wage rate for the
locality determined by the Secretary of Labor, including
fringe benefits, and incorporating the wage as a minimum to
be paid by the contractor when it is awarded a Government
service contract [7 8j .
Paul R. Shlemon effected that £777:
"Although the Service Contract Act was intended to benefit
'blue color workers,' the Department of Labor has, without
justification, implemented it as though it was intended to
cover all employees who were not covered either by the
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Davis-Bacon Act or the Walsh-Healey Act. It has issued
prevailing wage determinations covering. . .personnel clearly
not intended to be covered by the act."
As stated in the Federal Contracts Report, the purpose
of the act was to provide wage protection for service
employees who were "victims of fierce cost competition" in
service contracts Fl4:D-lJ." However, the real problem of
the act, in addition to curbing competition, was that it was
vague, ill defined, and resulted in the Department of Labor
interpreting regulations to implement the act, thereby
drawing complaints from the organized labor, O^PP, con-
tracting agencies and contractors [l4:D-lj.
The above ambiguity and complaints led to a revision of
the Act in 1972. Congress made it mandatory for the
Secretary of Labor to issue wage determinations under the
act and required service contractors to fulfill a "success-
orship obligation." Under section 4(c) of the amendment, a
successor contractor must compensate his employees no less
than the wages and fringe benefits paid by his predecessor
under a collective bargaining agreement when the new service
contract is for substantially the same work that will be
performed at the same location £l4:D-2j. Richard Depew
states that the 1972 amendment was unique in that it would
cause a constant increase in the cost of service contracts--
"the legislation stipulates that wages can only be modified
upward. This is considered highly inflationary and in-
consistent with the Government's desire to control the
present inflationary trends in the United States j"l8:8l."
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The act was again amended in 1976, ratifying the
Department of Labor's interpretations of the original act
and the definition of service employees was expanded to
cover clerical and other white collar workers within the
definition of service employee except those "employed in
bona fide executive, administrative, or professional
capacity £6 6J . " This expanded coverage prompted OFPP to
issue policy letter (No. 78-2) to prevent "wage busting"
for professional employees of Federal contractors. Effective
April 1, 1973, all solicitations included the language
contained in the policy letter whenever professional
employees are expected to perform the services, "Unwarranted
reductions in salaries and fringe benefits can occur during
competition for government service contracts [f->~l\ •
By a vote of 22 to 6, the House Labor committee in
February of 1978 approved still another amendment to the
1965 Service Contract to include protection for professional
employees against so-called "wage busting [ll:A-7j-"
This seems to be a direct contradiction to the Government
policy of fostering competition to the maximum practicable
extent. It is agreed that "unwarranted reductions in
salaries and fringe benefits can occur during competition,"
but why the overkill by enacting legislation that clearly
restricts competition of white collar professionals? The
contracting officer should determine what constitutes
"unwarranted" reductions that would be considered unfair.
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The contention that the Service Contract Act restricts
competition also applies to problem successor contracts.
In successor contracts, the incumbent contractor has a
clear competitive advantage knowing that his competitors
cannot propose a price lower than the price of the current
contract. The "successor contractor" provision of the act
may also be viewed as a form of auction technique--a price
floor is stipulated and proposals below that floor will not
be considered, even though a competitor can provide the same
services at a lower cost. The Department of Labor's current
interpretation, extending the successor contractor pro-
vision to all continuing requirements for services even
though the performance may be in a different location, further
limits competition. The Office of Federal Procurement Policy
contends that this policy acts to restrain competition for
those service contracts for v/hich the Government does not
specify a place of performance, or where performance is in
a different location £l^:A-l].
This is only a variation to the central contention that
the Service Contract Act successor contractor provision, as
well as the Department of Labor's wage determinations,
restrict competition. Labor rates are the essential elements
of service contracts and of many contract support service
contracts and are a crucial factor in competition. Under
the Act, it would seem that the extent of price competition
is reduced to the labor mix or number-of-hours of performance.
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In addition to restricting price competition, to the
researcher the Service Contract Act may also restrict
technical competition. The mandatory Department of Labor
wage determinations may prevent the Government's buying of
"value." In many technical or engineering contract support
services pushing the state-of-the-art, the government needs
to buy "value" brain power, or technical expertise. Although
"professionals" are exempt from the Service Contract Act
coverage, many "white collar" highly skilled engineers and
technicians are covered by the Act. Lacking a definition of
"professional", determination of Service Contract Act
coverage must be made on a time consuming case-by-case basis
by the Department of Labor. Thus, a contracting officer
may only buy value through an exception of the Act--by the
»' use of consul tants--in direct contradiction to the President's
policy of reducing the number of contracts to consultants.
Mr. Bill Rae, Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP)
Chief Counsel advises that satisfying the Government's
minimum needs with full and free competition would be
severely limited by revealing the maximum dollar amount
available for a particular contract £$9j. To the researcher,
this argument is also true for a minimum dollar amount which
the Service Contract Act imposes. Under the Act, proposals
are evaluated in accordance with the specifications and
the minimum dollar threshold instead of the specifications
themselves. Adequate specifications should be the only
constraint on the prospective bidders £o9j.
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The National Council of Technical Service Industries
urges repeal of the Service Contract Act. The Council
charges that the Act has led to "unnecessary additional
Federal expenditures of approximately p^OO million annually
for support services," runs counter to the President's
voluntary wage-price guidelines and is contrary to current
administration policy to deregulate industry since it "is
an outstanding example of unnecessary regulation and in-
trusion by the federal government into an important segment
of the private economy [l2:A-l4J. As pointed out "by Depew,
the act can only be termed as "bad legislation" £18:28] and
is not an asset to the contracting process.
G. CONSULTANTS
A consultant is defined by DAR 22-202 as a person who
is "exceptionally qualified, by education or experience in
a particular field to perform some specialized service."
Traditional definitions in the past referred to expert or
consultant services as a personal service and required the
procurement of such services through the Office of Civilian
Personnel Manual f 7 * 7j • However, Office of Management and
Budget Bulletin (0MB) No. 78-11 states that consulting
services can be obtained by personnel appointment or pro-
curement contract. Consulting services are defined as those
services of a purely advisory nature relating to the Govern-
mental functions of agency administration and management and
agency program managements when knowledge and experience
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on such matters are not generally available within the
agency. Examples of consultant services include:
a) advice on organizational structure and management
methods.
b) analysis of the impact of a program
c) policy and program analysis evaluation and advice£6^J.
This bulletin further provides that consulting services
will be obtained on an temporary basis only, will not be
used to perform work of a managerial nature, and will not
be used to bypass or undermine personnel ceilings, pay
limitations, or competitive employment procedures. Thus,
the contracting officer's role in the use of consultants
is expanded through the use of the contract as a vehicle to
obtain consultant services. His responsibilites increase
commensurately due to the management controls required.
In a statement to the Senate Governmental Affairs
Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting, and Management, James
Mclntyre , Deputy Director of the Office of Management and
Budget (0R1B) testified that the following controls (require-
ments) would be imposed for obtaining consultant services:
a) full justification of the requirement
b) specific, complete work statements specifying a
fixed period of performance for the service to be performed
c) maximum competition
d) appropriate disclosure and warning provisions to
avoid conflicts of interest




1. Background and Definition
Why the sudden high-level interest in consultant
services and concern with the control of such services?
President Carter stated that, "there has been, and continues
to be, evidence that some consulting services are being
used excessively, unnecessarily, and improperly [67J."
The media was quick to pick up on the President's
concern. A Chicago Tribune article noted that, "privately,
Carter advisers admit that reforming consultants may be
more difficult than reorganizing the government {.^-J." Bill
Peterson reported that more than one-fourth of the people
working for the Federal Government in 1976 were outside
experts and consultants, not included on normal Federal
payrolls L^l- -^n "^ e Consultant Mystery--',7ho Knows How
Much?", Lance Gay reports that "management has to look down
its own shirt, f32j" and on the CBS Evening News, Roger Mudd
reported that "nobody, not in Government or out, really
knows how many consultants there are, how much they get
paid and whether the public is getting its money worth
[^7J .
"
He further remarked that:
The pejorative term for consultants around Washington
these days is Beltway Bandits. The Government expert
who takes early retirement, sets up a small consulting
firm, and then charges the Government twice as much to
do his old job [^7j-
Such national attention and visibility forced 0MB
to promulgate, 0MB Bulletin 78-11 which established policy
and guidelines to be folbwed in determining and controlling
the appropriate use of consulting services.
62

2. The Role of the Contracting; Officer in Obtaining
Consulting Services
While the approval of consulting service arrangements
are required at a level above the requiring activity, the
contracting officer must be the resident expert on the
policy and guidelines effecting consulting services. He/
she should know the reasons why consultants are called in.
The major reasons are:
a. To obtain specialized opinions or professional
or technical advice which does not exist within the agency
or in another agency. Technology is developing and expanding
too rapidly in many areas to allow Government engineers and
technicians to keep fully abreast. Independent developments
in industry, university, or foundation research can contribute
to the core capability of many agencies [70:21lj.
b. To obtain independent outside points of view.
Consultants are disassociated from the longevity of a
particular project or program and can weigh issues on their
relative merits rather than in light of political
considerations [73*2201.
c. To obtain the opinion of noted experts whose
prestige can contribute to the success of important projects.
In industry the consultant with the highest price is often
viewed as the consultant with the highest prestige f28:1322.
Thus, the contracting officer must ensure that he com-
petitively buys value and not prestige.
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d. Evading Parkinson's Law. By contracting for a
short term task, projects that might inefficiently perpetuate
beyond their useful life are terminated upon completion of
the consultants contract [_73 : 22lJ.
e. The limitation of civilian personnel. OMB
78-11 prohibits the use of consulting services to bypass or
undermine personnel ceilings. However, when the agency is
responsible for the completion of certain projects, tasks
or missions, but does not have the authority to hire the
necessary staff, its only recourse, short of failure, is to
award contracts in support of those projects, tasks or
missions [7 3: 220J.
When asked by the researcher whether they would
adhere to the prohibition of using consultants services to
bypass civilian personnel ceilings if it meant failure of
a project or mission, the agencies replied that mission
support and responsibility took precedence over the
limitation set forth by OMB 78-11.
3. Consultants and Competition
The Contracting Officer must ensure that contracts
for consulting services are competitively awarded to the
maximum extent practicable to ensure that costs are reason-
able. John Rehfuss postulates that, with the exception of
manpower shortages, the reasons for using consultants arise
from information shortages or blockages within the organ-
ization. Thus the organization is unlikely to develop a
sophisticated proposal or Statement of Work for a consultant
£ k

to meet therefore relying on the consultant to specify his
service V?0 : 211J . This may restrict competition in the form
of the "preselection" of a consultant by the technical
personnel requiring the service. The reliance on the
consultant to specify his service may also result in an
"informally solicited proposal," in the guise of an
unsolicited proposal, based on informal communication of
the Government's needs to the consultant £l03j .
These excellent "foot-in-the-door" techniques are
utilized by many consultants and other white collar support
contractors to obtain follow-on contracts on a sole source
basis. As a result of "unique in depth knowledge",
"qualifications" or "unique expertise" obtained during the
performance of previous work", the contractor is assured of
the follow on effort, and may enjoy a perpetual sole source
position. A recent Navy Audit report found that of J2
Consultant/Engineering Services Contracts totaling $3. k
million, 28 (87^) were negotiated from unsolicited proposals
on a sole source basis £52:7J« This not only severely
restricts competition but strongly indicates that the con-
tractors exercised substantial discretionary judgement in
,
determining, articulating and accomplishing command manage-
ment functions. Additionally, 31 of the 32 contracts were
classified as personal service and therefore illegal, and
most of the services found in 27 of the J2 contracts could
have been performed by other Navy or DOD organizations
[52: 3-7j • Hence, the contracting officer must be extra
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critical of proposed sole source requirements for
consultant services. Many of the reasons given for the
use of outside consultants are, at best, flimsy when
evaluated in the light of alternatives [^0:229J.
As with other forms of contractor supoort services,
the Statement of Work (SOW) is a major factor in successful
competition of consultant contracts. It should be as brief
yet specific as possible. To encourage creativity and
innovation, the SOW should be written in terms of the
agency's requirements specifying that the contractor will
furnish "all necessary personnel, materials, and facilities
to accomplish the task." An estimated level of effort to
keep proposals within funding limits should be indicated by
the government with interm milestones and the content of
deliverable reports specified to provide a common base to
evaluate the competing proposals fl6: 56 J.
Other areas of concern in promoting competition of
consultant services include the factors delineated in the
section of the Contracting Process in this thesis. Although
general, they may be applied in obtaining consultant services.
However, a distinctive feature of contracting for
consultant services is the reliance on experience, whether
corporate or individual. Some firms list personnel who are
highly experienced and qualified but who are actually
dedicated to administration and management of the firm. In
the wording of resumes, a description of a person's work may
falsely project the individual's value in a project. For
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example, words such as "participated in" or "assisted"
may conceal his minor role in the project £28:1317.
Usually, work performed for previous agencies or clients is
often in as little detail as possible. This latter point
is the major difference between consultant services and
contractor support services and should he the evaluation
factor with the highest weight in competing for consultant
services. The differentiation among consultants is not
prestige or price or advanced degrees but how many of their
ideas or recommendations were implemented. This is the
bottom line in source selection of a consultant, and feed-
back on the success of recommendation implementation may
require the contracting officer to contact the agency who
has been the recipient of the offeror's consulting services.
If the consultant's recommendations were not implemented,
the contracting officer should consider the consultant's
competitors, or find out why the recommendations were not
implemented. If the consultant's recommendations were
implemented, and are applicable to the proposed requirement,
the contracting officer should consider technology transfer
between the agencies, thereby precluding the need for the
consultant.
Contracting officers and line management should be
judicious in the use of consultants. Indeed, they have
been, according to OMB, v/ho reported net reductions of 11.^
per cent (3»87^) in numbers of consultant services used by
the Government and 10.9 per cent ($197* 1 million) in cost
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during the period from June 30, 1977 to June 1, 1978 [iOjA-HJ.
When properly used, outside expertise can provide valuable
assistance in the conduct of agency business. Cost conscious
source selection be based on past performance and success of
recommendation implementation. But more often than not, the
results of a consultant's efforts is a final report that
decorates an executive's bookshelf with as much usefulness
as The Life and Mores of the Pluvios Aegiotius would decorate
his coffee table—and at considerably more expertise [_28:133J-
H. CONTRACT TYPES
The selection of the best contract type for a given
situation or requirement is a major decision the contracting
officer must make. The right type of contract can increase
competition and benefit both the contractor and the Govern-
ment. The contracting officer must consider many factors
in determining what type of contract to use or negotiate
in obtaining white collar contractor support services.
Belden and Cammack delineate some of these factors as
follows [2:120]:
1. The type and complexity of the item or service
being contracted for.
2. The urgency of the requirement.
3. The period of contract performance.
h. The degree of competition present.
5. The difficulty of estimating performance costs
because of the absence of definitive specifications, the
lack of production experience, or the instability of
design.
o. The availability of comparative cost data, firm
market prices, or wage levels.
7. Prior experience with the contractor.
8. The extent and nature of subcontracting anticipated.
9. The relationship of risk and profit.
10. The benefits of incentives.
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11. The technical capability and financial
responsibility of the contractor.
12. Adequacy of the contractor's accounting system.
13. The administrative cost to both parties.
With these factors in mind, the contracting officer must
decide whether to use a fixed-price contract or a cost
reimbursement contract. Discussions on several contract
types follow as they apply to contracting for white collar
support services, with emphasis being given to the Indefinite
Quantity/Labor Hour contract type. An analysis of two
innovative methods to acquire these types of services by the
Navy and the Air Force will also be offered.
1. Fixed-Price Contracts
In fixed-price contracts, the contractor agrees to
perform a service for a specified price thus placing the
greatest cost risk and performance risk on the contractor.
The kinds of fixed-price contracts discussed will be Firm
Fixed-Price (FFP) , Firm Fixed-Price resulting from the two-
step formal advertising method, and Firm Fixed-Price Level
of Effort (FFP/LOE) as they are generally the only kinds of
fixed-priced contracts that apply to contracting for con-
tractor support services primarily because of the lack of
definitive specifications. FFP contracts with economic
price adjustment (escalation) and fixed price redeterminable
contracts are normally for production items with provisions
for labor or material adjustments based on published,
established, or actual prices of specific materials or
indicies. Fixed-price incentive-type contracts are intended
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to encourage contractors to improve their cost, equipment
and schedule performance on production- type items.
The FFP contract is the most preferred type of contract
hecause the contractor theoretically assumes lOOfo of the risk
and responsibility of performance. It requires the minimum
amount of supervision and is used when a fair and reasonable
price can be determined at the inception of the contract.
It is particularly suitable for procurements of standard
commercial items, when specifications are reasonably
definite, production or service experience is present and
costs can be predicted with certainty. Mancuso points out
that continuous objections are raised against the use of
the FFP contract for research and development (R&D) study
efforts for various reasons including: a) this type of
contract subjects the Government to the risk of not getting
what it bargained for, and, b) the contractor's obligations
cannot be defined in sufficient detail to warrant its use
["^3: 27 1. Mancuso asserts that a FFP contract may be used
for R&D studies when the contract is for a paper study or
documentation of some form, the statement of work and the RFP
is v/ell written and thorough, and when competitive market
forces are present enabling selection of that firm that
offers the most advantages to the Government. Several R&D
studies are feasibility studies, concept definition studies,
or alternative concept exploration efforts that may be the
preclude to major on-going programs with potential for
follow-on contracts. The contractor will perform at a firm
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fixed-price not to maximize profit on the instant contract
but to allow greater monetary gains to be deferred to later
phases of the project or program. The motive for profit on
future contracts compels the firm to perform in a highly
effective manner in order to remain competitive. Therefore,
concludes Mancuso, the FFP contract represents a proper
application of the profit motive for R&D study contracts
p+3:29l. This argument may be made for most contractor
support services. Danhof supports Mancuso 's position
formulating that a FFP contract is a more attrative altern-
ative to the contractor than spending its own independent
research and development (I R&D) funds to keep abreast of
the state-of-the-art [ 17: 2^5 !• These points may be
effectively used by the astute contracting officer in
negotiating for contract type in a competitive (or even
sole source) environment.
Successful utilization of FFP contracts for R&D
studies or for similar contractor support services is
completely dependent upon the integrity and comprehensiveness
of the Statement of Work. This is true of all contract
types but even moreso with the FFP contracts. Hov/ever,
there may be occasions when a FFP contract is desired but
due to the uncertainty of the environment and inability of
the Government to specify the desired outcome of the require-
ment with confidence, a level of effort is contracted for.
In the firm fixed-price level of effort (FFP/LOS) , the
effort and number of hours are identified in the contract.
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The contract is complete when the contractor expends the
labor hours contracted' for; the Government buys the
contractor's best level of effort. A discussion of a unique
Air Force FFP/LOE follows.
a. An Innovative Firm Fixed-Price Level of Effort
(FFP/LOE) Contract
The Air Force Space and Missile Systems
Organization (SA3VS0) in Los Angeles, California, procured
system engineering support services in a new and interesting
manner r39"T. The RFP contemplated a small business set-
aside for a Firm Fixed-Price Level of Effort (FFP/LOE)
contract awarded on the basis of a technical and management
competition to that offeror whose proposal was deemed to be
most advantageous to the Government on an overall basis
considering past performance, level of experience, and
quality, qualifications and specific disciplines of its
technical staff. The Air Force predetermined that the
estimated price of the effort would not exceed $900,000 for
the first year, with an amount adjusted for economic growth
budgeted for a one year option period. The Air Force further
stated in the RFP that the level of effort expressed as the
total number of engineering hours to be provided during the
one year term was estimated to equate to a level of 11-12
person-months per month. Additionally, cost would not be
scored or rated in determining contractor selection and the
offeror was encouraged to submit his best proposal initially,
the Government reserving the right to make award based on
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initial submissions without further discussion or negotiations.
The RFP also stated that the Air Force had no intention or
desire to create an auction environment or to invite "buy-
ins." This is an innovative approach because it establishes
a price ceiling and does not consider cost as an evaluation
factor.
This innovative method of source selection
engenders controversy in several areas. The proponents of
inserting a dollar threshold in the solicitation beyond
which an award shall not be made claim that they are giving
the offeror information helpful in the preparation of their
proposal. In the real world competitive environment, some
offerors, usually the incumbent, may informally learn of the
funding ceiling available for a program or task. This
knowledge gives them an unfair competitive advantage. By
letting all offerors know the dollar ceiling or threshold,
this unfair competitive advantage is negated. Disclosure of
the maximum dollar threshold in the solicitation is also an
effective way to buy value because with the threshold known
to all offerors, cost is not a factor: competition is based
on the quality of personnel and innovation management. Mr.
Bill Rae, Chief Counsel for the Naval Supply Systems Command,
objects to the use of dollar thresholds noting that the
setting forth of the total dollar amount available for a
particular proposal retards full and free competition, does
violence to the minimum need theory, and does not allow for




In revealing a cost limitation or dollar threshold,
proposals will be tailored to the specifications and the
total dollar threshold instead of to the specifications
alone which should set forth the Government's minimum needs.
This severely limits competition for some firms may not
compete even though they have the potential for submitting
a good proposal because their price would exceed the stated
maximum dollar threshold. Other offerors may increase their
proposal cost because the forces of the competitive market
place have been reduced. Mr. Rae further articulates that
setting a maximum dollar threshold is in violation of both
the spirit and letter of 10 U.S.C. 2305(g) which states that
'proposals, including price, shall be solicited from the
maximum number of qualified sources" and cites 11^ Cong.
Rec. 20736 as concluding. .. "that the competitive range
encompasses both price and technical considerations. .. and
that negotiation of a contract without price competition
on the basis that a particular offeror would furnish services
of a higher quality than any other offeror was contrary to
10 U.S.C. 230Mg) [69]."
The Air Force also stated in the RFP that
submission of separate alternate proposals, providing
rationale is included indicating why the acceptance of an
alternate proposal would be more advantageous to the govern-
ment, would be considered. This condition was included for
those offerors who would meet the specifications below the
threshold amount. For example, an offeror who could provide
7^

the services required at $700, 000 could submit an alternate
proposal (s) for consideration in the amount of $200,000,
thereby bringing the total cost up to the $900,000 threshold.
This is in fact what actually occurred and Mr. Rae concludes
that by considering an alternate proposal, the government
has changed it requirements and therefore all offerors should
be given a chance to respond to the change in requirement FlO?].
Despite the objections raised by the Chief
Counsel of NAVSUP, this solicitation is viewed as a success
by the Air Force. Front loading the solicitation with all
known information, excluding numerical evaluation criteria,
resulted in proposals so complete and comprehensive that
award was based solely on the written proposals since the
contracting officer determined that discussion and negotiation
would not materially change the decision. This precluded any
possibility of auction techniques, technical leveling, or
buy-ins, and accelerated the contracting process. Most
noteworthy, according to the SAMS0 Contracting Officer, was
that the successful offeror "beat out" the incumbent who was
under a BOA at the time and whose position would normally
have provided him with a competitive advantage [[10^-J.
b. Two-Step Formal Advertising
Formal advertising is characterized by invitations
for bids which clearly describe the proposed contract.
Interested firms then submit bids and the contract is awarded
to the lowest responsive and responsible bidder whose bid
is most advantageous to the Government, price and other
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factors considered. Formal advertising is the preferred
method of contracting as it is inteded to give all firms an
equal opportunity to compete for government business.
Formal advertising requires a specific requirement (usually
a standard commercial product) and adherence to rigid and
well defined procedures which results in a firm fixed-price
contract.
In the white collar contract or support services
and R&D environment, definitive specifications of the degree
required for formal advertising are usually impossible to
attain. A variation of formal advertising, called two-step
formal advertising can be used with effectiveness in certain
conditions.
Two-step formal advertising is designed to expand
the use and benefits of formal advertising, competition, and
firm fixed-price contracts where inadequate specifications
preclude the use of formal advertising. The two-step formal
advertising method may be used for acquiring the white collar
support services. The procedure is conducted in two steps:
Step One consists of the request for submission,
evaluation and discussion of the technical proposal, without
pricing, to determine the acceptability of the services
offered. The technical proposals are solicited under open
competition from all interested sources. The understanding
of the technical requirements and services required is




Step Two is a formally advertised proposal
confined to those qualified sources who submitted an accept-
able technical proposal in step one. Bids submitted in step
two are evaluated without discussion and the award is made
on the basis of price alone to the low bidder on a i^FP
contract.
Two-step formal advertising may be used when:
(a) The statement of work is not sufficiently
definite or complete or may be too restrictive to permit
full and free competition. Discussion of the technical
aspects of the requirement is necessary to ensure mutual
understanding between each offeror and the government.
(b) Funding is available at time of award.
(c) Definite evaluation criteria exist for
evaluating technical proposals in order to establish minimum
qualification for each offeror in step one.
(d) More than one technically qualified source
is expected to be available.
(e) Sufficient time will be available for use
of the two-step method.
(f) A firm fixed-price contract or a firm
fixed-price contract with economic price adjustment will be
used. No other type of contract is permitted when using the
formal advertising method (DAR 2-503).
Some contracting officers voice concern over the
imposed rigidity of the process; namely, no discussion or
negotiation of price in step two. However, if step one
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proceeded as intended, there is no reason to negotiate or
discuss price in step two. The competitive marketplace
has determined the most fair and reasonable price.
Of equal concern to many contracting officers
is the inability to discern and eliminate the marginal con-
tractor during step one. Since the technical evaluation
criteria is based on the government's minimum requirements,
the step one technical evaluation can only eliminate the
unqualified offeror without setting a scale of acceptability
of those remaining. When coupled with the low bid award
in step two, the successful offeror is usually other than
the offeror with the technically superior approach [95 1.
This approach does prevent the buying of value, however, and
modifications to the two step process may be considered for
buying value. This entails raising the government's minimum
requirements in step one to those requirements desired by
the government. Hence, the government buys value and at
the same time eliminates "gold plating" --which often occurs
when the government buys value with a cost type contract.
In conclusion, given adequate time and funding,
the use of two-step formal advertising for acquiring white
collar support services can increase a competition, reduce
the government's administrative costs, and shift the cost
risk to the contractor. It may, to a certain extent, be
used to buy value and its expanded use should be encouraged.
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2. Cost Reimbursement Contracts
Five types of cost reimbursement contracts will be
briefly discussed in this section: Cost, Cost Sharing,
Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFP) , Cost-Plus-Incentive-^ee (CPIF)
and Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) . Cost reimbursement contracts
are used by the contracting officer when the magnitude of
the uncertainties in the Statement of Work precludes the use
of an acceptable fixed-price arrangement. The Government is
obligated to reimburse the contractor for all costs that are
reasonable, allowable and allocable to the contract as defined
in Section XV of DAR and the Cost Accounting Standards. Cost
reimbursement contracts are used only after a formal deter-
mination has been made by the contracting officer that any
other contract type will be more costly or that it is
impractical to obtain services via any other contract vehicle.
It is used in the following situations [53:V-26]:
1. When research and development work is required.
2. When the scope and nature of the work required
cannot be definitely described or its cost accurately
estimated.
3. When there is uncertainty concerning successful
project completion.
Many requirements for white collar contractor support
services fit the above criteria. When the requirement calls
for buying value, pushing the state of the art, or exploring
new concepts, the risk is such that a contractor will not
accept a fixed-price contract.
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From time to time the government may contract for
R&D services provided by non-profit organizations or edu-
cational institutions. In a Cost Type contract, the government
pays the DAR section XV cost with no fee. In development or
research projects jointly sponsored by the government and
the contractor, the government may pay an agreed upon
predetermined portion of DAR XV costs without fee. This
arrangement is termed a cost sharing agreement. A contractor
may agree to this arrangement if future commercial benefits
are anticipated, or to win an initial competitive require-
ment that may be the start of a potentially long running
program. The corporate experience gained at cost could put
the incumbent contractor in a favorable competitive position
in future requirements.
The Cost-Plus-Pixed Fee (CPFF) contract provides
reimbursement of the contractor for the costs that are
determined to be reasonable, allowable, and allocable and
provides for a fixed fee limited to 10% of estimated cost
for service contracts and 155^ of estimated cost for R&D
contracts. CPFF contracts provide the contractor with
little or no incentive to control costs and places the cost
risk on the government. The contractor may find it advisable
to increase his direct costs, thereby charging more of his
overhead or indirect costs to the contract. He may also
be able to justify high estimates on future contracts [25: 232]
.
Requirement for preliminary research, exploration or study
v/hen the level of effort is initially unknown may result in
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a CPFF Term contract. T,Ihen the task or job can be more
clearly defined and a definite goal or target can be
expressed, a CPFF Completion contract may be negotiated.
A Cost-Plus-Incentive-?ee (CPIF) contract is a
cost reimbursement contract with an incentive provision
based on a target cost, target fee, minimum and maximum fee,
and a share formula. It has the same fee limitations as
the CPFF. DAR 3-^05.^- states that its intended use is
primarily for development and test requirements when the
incentive formula can provide positive incentive for
effective contractor management. The fulcrum of the entire
incentive concept is the target cost. Belden and Commack
advance that realistic targets will be impossible to attain
if the government applies the pressures of competition for
unreasonable concessions, or if the contractor is allowed
to meet a competitive situation by offering buy in prices
that are patently unrealistic [_2:132l. However, even with
these unrealistic targets, the CP? is preferred over the
CPFF. In the case where the target cost is unrealistic,
perhaps a FFP/LOS or CPAF would be more appropriate.
The cost reimbursement contract type that holds the
greatest promise for the contracting officer is the Cost Plus
Award Fee (CPAF) contract. DAR 3-^05. 5(b) states that the
CRAF is suitable for:
(i) Level of effort contracts for performance of
services where mission feasibility is established but
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measurement of achievement must be made by subjective
evaluation rather than objective measurement, and
(ii) Work which would have been placed under another
type of contract if the performance objectives could be ex-
pressed in advance by definite milestones, targets or goals
susceptible or measuring actual performance.
The CPA? contains a base fee (generally jfo or less)
and a provision for the award fee to be adjusted upward
(up to 15$ of costs) commensurate with the contractor's
performance evaluated during or after completion in accord-
ance with criteria set forth in the contract. Belden and
Commack espouse that its potential lies in procurements for
term level of effort contracts, including R&D programs for
which the performance characteristics and requirements are
not sufficiently clear or definite at the start of a project
to use a standard incentive type contract [2:133].
Advantages of this contract type in contracting
for white collar contractor support services are numerous:
(a) Top management attention. The government award
fee evaluation board may be comprised of high agency manage-
ment who are kept abreast with milestone attainment and
contractor performances. Performance problems can be nipped
in the bud.
(b) Enhances open communication between the company's
top management and government top management.
(c) The award fee determined by the award fee
evaluation board is a unilateral action and can not be
disputed by the contractor.
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(d) Requirements that are subjective in nature (i.e.
level o'" effort, R&D or management studies, test evaluation,
software development) should be evaluated subjectively.
Perhaps the greatest advantage of the CPAF contract
is that it may be used to promote effective competition.
A firm that has confidence in its ability to provide the
service required has an incentive to offer a proposal at the
lowest cost possible v/ith the knowledge that if performance
is outstanding, the maximum fee can be attained. Even when
buying value, costs are an important factor in contractor
selection with CPA? contracts. The "value" is evaluated
by the evaluation board during or after performance. "Buying
In" is also discouraged with this type of contract: a
contractor who exceeds the negotiated estimate of cost
during performance may receive a minimum amount of award
fee. In short, the CPA? contract offers many advantages to
the contracting officer. It encourages a more effective
and economical effort and outcome by periodically evaluating
performance and adjusting the fee upward or downward, in
accordance with evaluation results.
3. The Indefinite Quantity /Labor Hour Contract
The Indefinite Quantity/Labor Hour Contract poses a
unique challenge to contracting officers. It contains
elements of both the fixed price contract type and the cost
reimbursement contract type. Used improperly, this type of
contract can severely restrict competition, is an "easy way
out" for both the customer and contracting officer, and is
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a candidate for a contract administration nightmare, and
perhaps even fraud. Used properly, this type of contract is
a flexible tool for the contractor, customer and contracting
officer in contracting for engineering/technical contracting
support services. This section will look at the applicabil-
ity, advantages, and disadvantages of this type of contract,
analyze the current debate within the Navy Field Procurement
System concerning its use, and discuss the current Naval Air
System Commands pilot plan for consolidating the procurement
of certain contract or support services into one competitive
indefinite quantity delivery type contract.
The Indefinite Quantity/Labor Hour Contract provides
for the purchase of contractor support services on the basis
of payment for labor performed at a fixed hourly rate that
includes direct and indirect labor, overhead, and profit.
Its use is limited to those conditions where it is not possible
to estimate with any degree of confidence, the duration and
cost of the services required at the time the contract is
placed. By its very definition the Indefinite Quantity/
Labor Hour Contract restricts competition. The statement
of work is very broad and general in scope; the exact nature,
extent and duration is not known at time of award. Ruben
Israelian terms this "fictitious competition" for how can a
contractor compete if he doesn't know what he's competing
for f93}? What the offeror proposes are labor rates for
particular labor categories. The fallacy is that the low
offeror can actually cost more to the government. It could
8^

take the low offeror longer to complete the task than a
contractor who offers a highly qualified person at a higher
rate who completes the task in less time. Proper evaluation
of the broad statement of work is nearly impossible; how
could it be otherwise when a company's efficiency in the
performance of work (as yet undefined) cannot be assessed
A discussion of other problems inherent in Indefinite
Quantity/Labor Hour Contracts follows:
(a) Once the basic contract is awarded, task or
delivery orders specify the task to be performed, the labor
category, the number of hours, the hourly rate and the ceil-
ing amount for the order. The total price increases as the
number of hours performed increases up to the ceiling, with
no incentive provisions for cost control.
(b) Government surveillance is essential to ensure
performance is not inefficient or wasteful. Proper admin-
istration costs are high and delivery orders are often
administered by personnel with little knowledge of the
regulations of the law. Generally, the Indefinite Quantity/
Labor Hour Contract is rarely audited after award L/^^oJ.
(c) The lack of management control of this type of
contract is of primary concern to the Navy's Contract Manage-
ment Review (CMR) teams. An overly general statement of
work may permit an ordering activity to abuse the contract,
personal services situations may emerge, and in some cases
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is an invitation to fraud. (One CMR found the ordering
officer also signing and certifying invoices f" 3'4 7
.
(d) The contractor can substitute high labor rates
for those tasks that require lower rates and shift hours
from one order to another to avoid under/overuns, frequently
resulting in the final order billing price exactly equalling
the ceiling price. This should be a very unlikely occurence
on a labor intensive order {"^^-:85j.
The advantage of the Indefinite Quantity/Labor Hour
Contract is the flexibility it provides the contracting
officer and ordering officer. Orders are placed only after
the need arises. The contracting officer may authorize the
ordering officer to approve and sign all tasks or orders
under the master contract. The tasks take less time to
process than the normal processing time to award an individual
contract to cover the requirement. In addition, funds are
furnished on a task basis and are not available prior to
the determination of the need for a particular task. There-
fore the customer project or program manager can obligate
funds as they become available and the Indefinite Quantity/
Labor Hour Contract is the most responsive to his needs.
In summary, the determination to use an Indefinite
Quantity Contract with a Labor Hour pricing arrangement is
dependent upon a series of questions that must be addressed
by the contracting officer f9oj. (a) Can the tasks be
sufficiently defined and can a specific level of effort for
the contract period be specified in the planning stages of
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the contract requirement? (b) Are funds currently
available to cover the required tasks? (c) Is the urgency
of need such that the required response time precludes the
normal contracting process? (d) Is there any other type
of contract that can be used?
This latter point deserves further attention inasmuch
as the Indefinite Quantity contract is the least preferred
of contract types. A determination must be made by the
contracting officer that no other contract type such as a
Firm Fixed Price (FFP) , Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CFFF) , CPFF
term or Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA) would suffice for
those requirements exceeding $10 , 000.
The problem with the FFP contract for requirements
that may qualify for an Indefinite Quantity/Labor Hour
Contract is two fold: first, the statement of work cannot
be specifically defined at the date of contract award and
secondly, funds are not available. While the cost type
contract does not require a specifically defined statement
of work, funds must be available to cover the contract
period. The CPFF term type contract incurs the same funding
problem described above. Additionally, while the requiring
activity may be able to estimate the number of hours required
during the performance period of the contract, they usually
cannot do so with sufficient confidence to establish a
specific level of effort to be performed during a specified
period of time insofar as the tasks come from various sources
at various times. Resultantly, there is no basis on which
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to negotiate an appropriate fee. A BOA is not considered
appropriate for this type of requirement for two reasons.
First, some requiring activities do not have Contract
Authority and, therefore, would not be authorized to issue
an order under a BOA. Second, the task response time is
too short considering the time necessary to follow DAR
procedures for orders under a BOA. These include competitive
quotes, synopsis requirements, and the need to solicit
other than the BOA holders. While the contracting officer
must make these determinations, the end user, usually the
project manager, is in the best position to issue the
individual order specifying the exact nature and duration
of the work to be performed [5&J- However, for control
purposes a delivery order officer (GS110 2 series) trained
in contracting or the contracting officer should issue the
individual orders [95]
.
a. Navy Field Procurement System Debate
The different perspectives concerning flexibility
and customer response on the other hand, and lack of con-
tracting officer control on the other, can be seen by the
ongoing controversy between the Naval Regional Contracting
Office (NRCO) in Washington, D.C., and the David W. Taylor
Naval Ships Research and Development Center (DTNSRDC),
Bethesda, Md. Under the Navy Field Procurement System, it
is the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) policy to
maximize the effectiveness, efficiency and responsiveness
of the NRCO's at the highest levels of contract complexities
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generated within each, procurement region. DTNSRDC is a
field activity with contracting authority up to 3100,000.
Those contract requests over $100,000 are forwarded to NRC0
Washington for action f58:par IO30]. Currently, NRC0
Washington is the Contracting Office for twenty Master
Indefinite Quantity/Labor Hour contracts with DTNSRDC s
contracting officer's authorized as ordering officers. NRC0
Washington proposes to withdraw DTNSRDC' s Ordering Officer
status and to compete the Indefinite Quality/Labor Hour
Contracts upon expiration as a series of CPF? level of effort
contracts citing lack of control and a statistical reporting
problem. NRC0 negotiates the master contract and does not
receive statistical procurement credit for the tasks issued
from DTNSRDC. This also detrimentally effects grade levels
and personnel ceilings of NRC0. DTNSRDC defended the use of
the master indefinite quantity type contracts to the Chief
of Naval Material based on the responsiveness and funding
flexibility, and assaulted NRCO's concern with statistical
credit as "action that subordinates the operational need for
responsive and timely contracting to an administrative
statistical need £l8j." Yet a third player is introduced
into the as yet unresolved debate, because DTNSRDC, as a
Navy Laboratory, reports to the Chief of Naval Material for
its line Research and Development mission even though, as a
field activity of NAVSUP, DTNSRDC procurement authority and
support is determined by NAVSUF [58J.
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The use of the Indefinite Quantity/Labor Hour
Contract will always be the preferred method for government
technical personnel for contracting for white collar support
services. As summarized "by Mike Stanton of DTNSRDC's Systems
Development Department [ll2j:
In the R&D environment we can't predict or define our
contract needs with any degree of certainty. VJith this
type of flexible contract arrangement, the Center is
able to sell its programs to sponsors at the SYSCOMS
because of our responsiveness. And with the uncertainty
of the funding situation, we are often in the reaction
mode to Crisis Management by the sponsors.
Industry echoes the same conclusion; not only
is it the "only way to go" but its a great marketing device
for the contractor holding an Indefinite Quantity Contract
because it acts as a "hunting license" for the program manager
looking for a way to spend dollars in support of his program
with the minimum amount of time and red tape£l09j."
Some small business representatives claim that
the Indefinite Quantity/Labor Hour Contract restricts
competition to large business. This is usually not the case
because the labor intensive aspects of these contract types
do not require large capital outlays as would be the case
in production contracts. Additionally in the engineering/
technical services arena there is no such thing as sole
source due to the broad statement of work. However, there
may be a most qualified source for certain tasks. Thus, even
after the Indefinite Quantity/Labor Hour Contracis have been
awarded competitively, there may be competition between the
contract holders for specific tasks.
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b. The Consolidated Logistics Support Indefinite
Quantity Labor vIour type Contract--A Pilot Plan
The singularly most innovative approach to
contracting for contractor support services in the Navy is
a pilot plan executed and managed by the Naval Air Systems
Command for the Logistics/Pleet Support Group, NAVAIR 0^.
During FY 1977. 1^5 separate cost type contracts with 50
contractors totaling $13' 6 million dollars were awarded
for contractor support services through NAVAIR' s Naval Air
Engineering Center (NAEC) Lakehurst, New Jersey facility.
The effort required to initiate, award, and administer such
a large number of relatively small contracts severely taxed
the Air 0^ staff. It was determined to be more economical
to consolidate the NAVAIR 0^4- logistics support requirements
into one large scale RFP with three separate lots. An
indefinite quantity labor hour type contract was contemplated
with award made by lots, to support air vehicles, missiles,
ground support equipment, training, propulsion and
avionics [.^J.
c. Advantages and Disadvantages of Consolidated
Procurement
The concept of consolidated procurement has
definite advantages
:
(1) Providing for centralized contracting
with attendant visibility and control, thus eliminating




(2) A single contractor is responsible for the
total management effort involved.
(3) Maximization of competition for support
services contracts. Some may argue that consolidation
tends to restrict competition, since a smaller number of
firms would be able to undertake a large complex contract
than would be the case if a number of smaller contracts
were awarded. This is particularly the case with many
small business and minority business enterprises. However,
in NAVAIR's pilot plan, competition was enhanced and all three
lots were completed as small business set-asides.
(^) Providing control for the minimization
of personal services situations in both the award and
administration of these support services.
(5) Reduced administrative costs since fewer
government personnel are required to administer a large
contract than several smaller contracts.
(6) Total contract costs may be reduced through
economies of scale.
Arguments against consolidation include:
(1) The reduction of competition. This may
occur if the statement of work is too complex or if the scope
of work involved is beyond the reach of small business or
minority enterprises.
(2) Higher costs in overhead where significant
subcontractor effort is involved.




MAYAIR weighed the advantages and the disadvantages
knowing that their pilot plan would attract the interest of
other contracting officers, Congress, Civil Service Com-
mission, and various unions. Despite the initial slow
progress and difficulty of combining the over 140 contracts
into one consolidated solicitation, the pilot plan was
implemented with the hope that it would "attract lively
competition from the private sector and would lead to an
increase in the level of technical control and procurement
discipline [4-2]."
The lesson learned to date on the pilot plan is
the reduction of administration burden required to monitor
indefinite quantity contracts rather than 1^5 cost type
contracts. A relaxation in the experience required in the
statement of work would have increased competition, although
as far as competition is concerned, the pilot plan was an
immediate success. Concludes CDR Ligon of MAYAIR, "It is
too early to assess the total success of the effort but so
far it looks good£l02j."
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IV. IMPROVING THE CONTRACTING PROCESS TO INCREASE
COMPETITION 0? CONTRACTOR SUPPORT SERVICES IN
THE PRE-AWARD PHASE
Before addressing the specific processes in the pre-
award phase of competing for contractor support services, we
must look at a key element that has a direct hearing on the
success or failure of any contract action-
-
education . Edu-
cation and training by the contracting officer falls into
two general categories:
1. Customer Education: quarterly or semi-annual
training sessions should be held with functional managers
and customers to familiarize these personnel with the
capabilities and restrictions, do's and don'ts, and
applicability and limitations of the DOE contracting system.
Procurement Planning, competition, a brief overview of the
DAR, and a general understanding of the contracting process
should be stressed with the bottom line being that every
contractual action requires a team effort between many
players and an important player is the customer. The most
successful contracting offices develop procurement or con-
tracting guidelines written in laymen's terms emphasizing the
importance of customer/contracting officer interaction,
communication, and feedback.
The extent of and effectiveness of competition is
directly influenced by both education and planning. By
working with contracting personnel in the earliest stages
9^

of the procurement, adequate time for the competitive
process can be allocated and planned.
2. Education of Contracting Personnel. In addition
to the mandatory DOD courses required for contracting
personnel (GS-1102 series), in-house training sessions
promoting cross-fertilization of experiences and new ideas
are encouraged. These sessions can emphasize the Government's
policy on competition and innovative techniques or success-
ful past methods of securing competition may be "brains to rmed"
or analyzed. Participation in National Contract Management
Association (NCMA) activity can further benefit contracting
personnel, as well as pursuing undergraduate and graduate
management and business courses. The goal of each con-
tracting officer, contract specialist, contract negotiator
or contract administrator should be to increase his or her
professionalism.
Professor Ralph Nash, at the 1979 National Contract
Management Association Symposium, Washington, D.C. submitted
that the number one problem in procurement and contracting
today is a "people problem and not a process problem."
Effort by the contracting officer to educate and train both
contract personnel and users, i.e., attacking the "people




A. MAJOR PRE-AWARD CONSIDERATIONS
The contracting officer's efforts in a successful
pre-award phase of the contracting process should include
consideration of many factors. The factors addressed here
will be
:
1. Determination of the type of service required
2. Formulation of the acquisition strategy
3. Competition
Subfactors under each of the above major categories will also
be addressed. Although the contracting officer is respon-
sible for addressing these factors to ensure that the
competitive contracting process is accomplished satisfact-
orily, coordination, communication and integration with the
customer and other personnel is necessary. These factors
and subfactors will be presented in a general chronological
order.
A planning or acquisition strategy meeting between the
functional managers (key customer players) and the contracting
officer or his representative should be held as soon as the
functional manager knows he intends to contract out. The
earlier this is done the better enabling the contracting
officer and the customer to coordinate their efforts to
foster a successful contract. The initial meeting should
address the following factors in general terms allowing the
participants to commence effective planning necessary for




1. Type of Service
A determination of the service required must be
made to enable the contracting officer to intelligently
participate in the acquisition strategy. Consideration of
many elements form the foundation of a sound acquisition
strategy. These elements include:
a. The determination that the type of service
contract required is for one (or more) of the twenty tv/o
services defined by DAR 22-101. These services may be
performed by one of three categories of services as defined
in part 1 of this thesis:
(1) Expert and consultant services
(2) Contractor Support Services
(3) Commercial or Industrial (C/I)
Activities Support Services
b. Personal vs. nonpersonal services
determination. Pursuant to DAR 22-102 and SECNAVINST 4200.6,
a Personal Services versus Nonpersonal Services Questionnaire
must be prepared by the customer or line manager for sub-
mission with the purchase request. A determination that
the services required are nonpersonal is then made by the
procuring contracting officer. Concurrence in that deter-
mination is required by legal counsel and approval of the
questionnaire is required by a level higher than the
contracting officer.
c. Compliance v/ith 0MB 78-11 by the contracting
officer, if the use of temporary nonpersonal service
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consultants is requested. Personal service type consultants
must be obtained through the personnel officer in accordance
with the Civilian Personnel Manual. In certain limited
conditions it is desirable for the Government to have that
sort of supervision and control which is generally improper
(personal services) but where the short duration of work
dictates against hiring or appointing in accordance v/ith
Civil Service laws. Authority under 5 USC 3109 (DAR 22-201)
may be used for contracting out for the personal services of
experts and consultants on a temporary or intermittant
basis. This authority is very limited in scope and requires
Higher Procuring Agency (HPA) approval.
d. The applicability of the Service Contract
Act must be determined. As addressed in the body of this
thesis, the Service Contract Act, as amended, applies to
white collar services as well as blue collar services. The
contracting officer must request a wage determination from
the Department of Labor for any- contract which exceeds
$2,500 on Standard Form 98, "Notice of Intention to Make a
Service Contract and Response to Notice." This request must
be filed not less than 30 days prior to commencement of
negotiations.
e. If the requirement for contractor support
services involves an aggregate obligation of funds in excess
of $50,000, the requirement must be reviewed and approved by
the commanding officer at the field activity level (NAVMAT
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INST k-200.52). This must be accomplished prior to the
receipt of the request for services by the contracting
officer.
2. Acquisition Strategy
The acquisition strategy in the pre-award
phase commenced when attention was directed to the major
category reviewed previously in determining the type of
services required. With this background information, the
contracting officer, teamed with the customer or line
manager, can prepare and implement the acquisition strategy.
Factors for consideration include:
a. Complex and costly services may require
a formal procurement plan complete with milestones in
accordance with DAR 1-2100. The principles of this formal
procurement plan are sound and have application to any
service contract request.
b. The cost considerations of the required
services must be evaluated. The significance of independent
Government estimates has been stressed in the prior discussion
of Indefinite Quantity/Labor Hour contracts (for task or
delivery orders), as well as other contract types. Of
equal significance is the dollar threshold approval level
within the agency or activity. The approval process for the
various thresholds may be time consuming and the threshold
levels differ from activity to activity depending on pro-
curement authority and other factors. The contracting
officer must be cognizant of the various threshold approval
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levels and plan accordingly. An example of these threshold
approval levels may be found in Exhibit II.
c. An important factor that must be addressed
is the timeframe involved in the contracting process, in-
cluding the procurement administrative lead time (PALT), the
required award date, the duration of performance, and the
contract completion date. Both the PALT and award date
are directly affected by the adequacy of planning, the
complexity and estimated cost of the required services, the
completion of a conclusive statement of work (SOW) , eval-
uation criteria and RFP, the obtaining of the required
approval signatures, and other administrative considerations
included in the following sections. 7or example, without
effective planning, a customer incorrectly may base a sole
source justification on the urgency of the procurement
request: the urgency may actually be a result of the
customer's procrastination in planning rather than a
bonafide urgent requirement.
The interdependence and proper phasing of the
various elements in the contracting process may be seen by
another example showing the detrimental effect on the total
contracting effort. If a SOW is late in arriving from the
technical customer, at least two problems may occur. The
contract award may be delayed resulting in a late delivery
or late contract commencement of the services required, or
the solicitation time may be compressed, resulting in
reduced competition and possibly higher prices [lloj
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Other time considerations that may affect
price and the comprehensiveness of the service performance
concerns the time required for contract completion after
award. A condensed performance schedule may be a) more
expensive i.e., the Government buys the contractor's over-
time, and, b) the lack of performance time may result in an
incomplete service. The duration of contract performance
may also be affected by option provisions. When requirements
or funding for additional services are anticipated but not
firm, it may be appropriate to include an option in the
contract (DAR 1-1502). Under an option, the contracting
officer may elect to purchase additional services of the
same type within the period of performance of the basic
contract or under an extension. The option may act as a
form of incentive— the contractor is motivated to perform
satisfactorily because of prospective additional work. On
the other hand, the exercising of an option restricts the
opportunity for competition. The contracting officer must
consider these factors, as well as fund availaibility, in
his decision to include an option clause in a contract.
Transition plans to phase from one contractor
to another may be necessary. When the incumbent contractor
fails to obtain the follow on contract, some set of phase-in/
phase-out provisions must be considered.
d. Funds availibility and source of funds must
be considered. Annual funds such as Operations & Maintenance,
Navy (O&M.N) must be obligated during the current appropriated
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year. Contractor support services may also use Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) funds, a multiple
year appropriation available for incurring obligations up to
two years after the funds are authorized, depending upon the
type of service needed. This multiple year appropriation
offers the contracting officer more flexibility than the
annual appropriation. The availability of funds is also a
major consideration in the contracting process. The con-
tract commencement date, level of effort, extent of services,
option provisions and contract type are all dependent on the
availability of funds and their apportionment.
e. The foundation of the R?P, the acquisition
strategy, and the competitive contracting process is the
Statement of Work (SOW). In preparing the SO' J , the following
elements must be considered f 59 s ^-1"\ .
(1) a general description of the required
objectives and desired results.
(2) background information helpful to a
clear understanding of the requirements and how they evolved.
(3) technical considerations.
(^) a detailed description of the technical
requirements and tasks.
(5) a notation of reporting requirements and
any other deliverable items, such as data (documents,
studies, reports).
(6) other special considerations.
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Preparation of the SO'.' should be a comprehensive
and dedicated effort by the customer or line manager. Add-
itional considerations are delineated in the SOW section in
Chapter III of this thesis.
f
.
Building upon the SOW are the evaluation
criteria required when award is to be based on factors other
than cost. The evaluation may be accomplished by a Board
consisting of the customer, in-house technical personnel
familiar v/ith the requirement, and independent evaluators
familiar with the technical expertise required. The com-
position of the Board is dependent upon financial thresholds
that differ from activity to activity. The section on
Evaluation "^actors in Chapter II addresses major considerations
of the evaluation process including objectivity, general
quality and responsiveness of the proposal, technical
approach, the organization, capability and personnel ex-
perience of the offeror, past performance and risk assessment.
g. The selection of the contract type best
suited for a given situation or requirement is a major
decision the contracting officer must make. The right type
of contract can increase competition and benefit both the
contractor and the Government. The many factors the con-
tracting officer should consider are discussed in the
Contract Types section of this thesis.
h. Will the contractor require or have access
to classified information, material or areas during per-
formance of the contract? If so a DD ?orm 25^ "Contract
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Security Classification Specification," and a DD Form 25^C
if there is no security classification guide for the project
or task involved, must be approved "by the security officer.
i. What are the data requirements of the
proposed contract? Is proprietary data involved? If data
is to be delivered under contract, a Contract Data Require-
ments List (CDRL), DD Form 1^23, and a Data Item Description
(DID) DD Form ~L66k may be required in accordance with DAR
7-10^.9 and 9-505 respectively. The data requirements may
also need approval from a Data Requirement Review Board (DRRE)
or a designated data Manager. The acquisition of data, and
its proper management can increase competition in future
contracting efforts.
j. If patentable inventions are likely to
result from the performance of the contract, the Government
must determine what rights to acquire. In accordance with
DAR 9-107*2 and 7-302.23. a patent rights recommendation must
be made by a patent counsel to the contracting officer.
k. Who will administer the contract? Although
this thesis does not address contract administration, its
importance in the pre-award phase cannot be overlooked. Con-
tract administration covers the whole post-award phase and
includes such functions as contract surveillance, inspection
and acceptance of services, and payment of invoices. The
administration of these services is normally performed by
the Contracting Officers Technical Representatives (COTR) In
accordance with SECNAVINST ^200. 27A and NAVSUPIKST ^33.6.
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1. The compilation and integration of the
preceeding factors form the Request for Proposal (RFP) , the
vehicle used to communicate the Government's needs to the
offeror in a negotiated procurement. As most of the require-
ments for contractor support services are procured by the
negotiated method, as supported by Chapter II of this thesis,
on occasion these same factors may be built in an IFB to foster
competition using the two-step formal advertising method.
Given sufficient proposal preparation time and applying the
factors addressed herein, the contracting process may be
used to promote and perpetuate competition for contractor
support services.
3. Additional Corn-petition Considerations
The importance of competition, both price and
technical, has been previously addressed in this thesis,
as has the requirement for effective competition. The need
for increased competition for contractor support services
has also been emphasized in light of the Government's growing
reliance on these services due to manpower constraints pre-
cipitated by budget reductions. It was pointed out that
early planning, education of the participants in the con-
tracting process, and an understanding of the basic problems
associated with contractor support services are the foundations
of effective competition for these services. Further con-
siderations to assist in the promotion of competition include
the adequacy of the sole source justification, actions of the
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Contract Review Board (CRB) , finding potential sources, and
avoiding conflict of interest situations.
':Jhen only one contractor and no other is qualified
to perform a service, the purchase request must be accompanied
by a sole source justification. This justification must be
approved by the contracting officer of Contract Review Eoard.
(See Appendix A) A sole source justification must clearly
and conclusively demonstrate that only the services of a
particular firm will satisfy the actual, minimum needs of
the requirement. All justifications must be concise (no more
than one type written page) and specifically state why the
proposed procurement cannot be made on a competitive basis by
demonstrable assertions that logically support that conclusion
while logically excluding other possibilities. Sole source
justifications should be presented by the customer, project
engineer, or drafter to the contract review board.
This study will not attempt to offer a "guide" to
sole source justification writing. Detailed criteria for
defining or justifying a sole source are not provided by law
or regulation. Each justification must stand on its own and
the contracting officer and contract review board must be
critical of inadequate sole source justification. The
contracting officer must question any weakness in a justification
and put the burden of proof on the drafter of the justification.
RADM E. A. Grinstead, SC , USN , Commander, Naval Supply Systems
Command, summarized many problems of sole source justifications
in a letter sent to the commanding officers of major Navy Field
Procurement Activities [33j :
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...many sole source justifications attested to the
comnetence of the chosen contractor but did not explain
- why other firms could not perform the services. No
specific qualifications that only the chosen firm possessed
were spelled out. In fact, some justifications were
written by the contractor for the government official's
signature! As a result, most justifications, though for
very different services, were virtually identical. This
signals a wholesale disregard for the policy of obtaining
the maximum possible competition.
A recent Naval Audit Service audit found that 97$ of
the sole source justifications of one Navy Field Procurement
activity were approved eventuallyby the contracting officer
or the contract review board even though many of the just-
ifications were questionable f 5
3
: 1^ ' Another Naval Audit
Service report found that many procurements are awarded sole
source for "convenience" rather than as the most appropriate
and cost effective type of procurement J*5^!l5j' The same
audit also found that:
The primary reason for misuse of sole source is apparently
to award a contract to a preselected contractor. Many of
the procurements are for continuation of services already
obtained by contract; therefore the requirements are known
well in advance and there is ample time to solicit
competition.
Aside from the contracting officer's early involvement
in contract planning which in turn should ensure the integrity
of the competitive process, the requirement by the contracting
officer and the contract review board for a strong, conclusive,
demonstrable sole source justification is the singularly most
important measure that can be taken by the contracting officer
to increase competition. This requirement forces the line
manager or customer to start contract planning in the early
stages of requirements determination, rechanneling his or her
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energy to the competitive process: planning, drafting the
statement of work, developing evaluation criteria, and
providing the contracting officer with possible sources. As
pointed out in Chapter II of this thesis, a consistently
tough and aggressive contract review board can help in this
process by forcing line management to think "competition"
up front. Competition--not sole source contracting—should
be the rule rather than the exception,
a. binding Potential Sources
Once the technical manager is thinking "competition"
rather than sole source, many services are so specialized
that the competing community may be small—and the technical
manager should be able to provide a list of potential sources
with his purchase request. Each activity should develop
their own source list based on historical demand or input
from other field activities.
The small business specialist at the activity
level can assist in identifying prospective contractor
support service contractors. The small business specialist
should be eager to assist the contracting officer due to the
"attractiveness of service contracting for fostering small
business procurement programs ^7 9* 1^+3 " ^his applies to
both small business and minority business (8A) enterprises.
Potential contractors may be identified by an
announcement in the Commerce Business Daily (CBD) inviting
interested firms to submit their qualifications and capa-
bilities in a specific area. The use of the CBD is required
for Request for Proposals (R?Ps) and awards over $10,000.
108

A solicitation for information or planning
purposes, Request for Quotation (RFQ) , or a letter of intent
may be issued to perspective contractors to determine the
feasibility of performance, existence of ideas or prior
work in research and development, or seeking technically
advanced contractor support services contractors. The use
of the RRQ requires the approval at a level above the con-
tracting officer and responses to RFQs cannot be used as the
basis for awarding a contract.
Prospective contractors may also be found or
encouraged to participate by holding a pre-proposal or pre-
bid conference. While the S0T,J and RPP should stand on their
own, the presolicitation or pre-proposal conference is an
effective problem avoidance technique where questions can be
answered, misunderstandings can be resolved and input from
industry may be utilized to improve the quality of the
contracting process for the proposed contract. With this
free and equal communication of Government requirements,
"inside tracks" that may give one offeror a competitive
advantage may be avoided. A post-award conference may also
be helpful to an unsuccessful offeror for future requirements,
b. Organizational Conflict of Interest
Possible organizational conflict of interest
situations can be avoided by planning, education, and
effective Contract Review Board actions. Organizational
conflict of interest comprimises the integrity of the con-
tracting process. The following examples demonstrate a
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contractor's unfair competitive advantage over other sources
and therefore should not normally be considered as a pro-
spective source:
(1) Government employees or business organizations
which are owned or controlled by Government employees should
not be considered as potential sources.
(2) Procurement of a system or service for which
the contractor provided systems engineering or technical
direction.
(3) Competitive procurements of services in
accordance with specifications or statements of work the
contractor drafted or assisted in the preparation of; and
('-0 Competitive procurements resulting from, or
in the same field, as a Government study the contractor per-
formed that required access to the proprietary data of other
contractors.
The provisions of DAR Appendix G, "Rules for the
Avoidance of Organizational Conflicts of Interest," should
be reviewed where the possibility of such a conflict of
interest exists.
3. SUMMARY
With aggressive and early planning, consideration of
the preceeding factors, and a conclusive RFF, the contracting
officer is well underway to a successful completion of the
Pre-award phase. In "front loading" the contracting process,
the contracting officer has smoothed the way for problem
minimization in the source solicitation phase, source
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evaluation phase, negotiation phase, and source selection
phase. These successful phases in turn, have paved the way
for a more effective and efficient award phase and post-
award phase. In short, by building a foundation through
the applications of the elements discussed in the preceeding
sections and the normative pre-award phase in the contracting
process, competition for contractor support services can be
increased resulting in improved contractor support of the
Navy's and DOD ' s mission.
Ill

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The researcher would make the following conclusions
and recommendations "based on the study and research
presented in previous chapters. The conclusions lend
themselves to immediate subsequent recommendations and
therefore each conclusions will be followed by a specific
recommendation consistent with the nature of the conclusion.
1. Conclusion : There is an increasing use of contractor
support services at all levels within the Navy Command
structure coupled with a steady decline in comoeting for
these services. The contracting officer must be cognizant
of the many complexities and problems inherent with com-
peting for contractor support services.
Recommendation : The contracting officer should be unfailing
in his/her efforts to understand the nuances of contractor
support services and to promote competition of these
services. By synthesising and applying the concepts con-
cerning the competition of contractor support services
surfaced in this thesis, the contracting officer can make
positive headway in satisfactorily answering the central
research question of this thesis, "Is it feasible for the
contracting officer to improve the extent of competition
of contractor support services?" The answer is an
unequivocal "AFFIRMATIVE" and rests with the professionalism,




2. Conclusion : There is a lack of aggressiveness on
i
the part of many contracting officers and Contract Review
Boards to unify the efforts of contracting personnel and
Government technical personnel and line management towards
increasing competition of contractor support services. This
is evidenced by the literature in this field and by those
Naval Audit Service and Contract Management reviews, and
research findings reported in this thesis.
Recommendation : Training and education programs on basic
contracting should be implemented by the contracting officer
to force technical 1 customers to think "competition" up front
in the contracting process. This, in conjunction with
energetic and forceful contracting officer and Contract
Review Board actions, should redirect the time spent on sole
source justifications to time more constructively spent in
developing conclusive statements of work, evaluation criteria,
and incentive preparation of requirements that increase
effective competition. The contracting officer must success-
fully apply his/her knowledge and understanding of the
problems inherent in competing for contracting support
services to the contracting process. These actions would
significantly increase competition for both contractor
support services and consultant services.
3. Conclusion : Although there is high level management
concern and emphasis regarding personal versus nonpersonal
services, there are no definitive rules for determining
whether services are personal or nonpersonal. Oftentimes
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the distinction between the two is nebulous at best.
Personal service situations generally arise from the lack
of education and training and not from the lack of integrity.
Recommendations ; The contracting officer should take
positive action to educate technical and contracting per-
sonnel alike in dealing with the personal vs nonpersonal
dilemma. The contracting officer must possess an understand-
ing of past contract law pertaining to contract support
services and should work closely with legal counsel, con-
tracting officers technical representatives (KOTRs), and
other technical personnel to avoid personal services
situations.
k. Conclusion : The evaluation criteria for contractor
support services as currently used is not structured appro-
priately to accomplish its intended objective. Relevant
information that would increase competition is frequently
withheld.
Recommendation : All information that would assist the
offeror in the preparation of a competitive responsive pro-
posal should be divulged and specifically delineated, in the
Government's requirement, including the disclosure of
precise numerical relative weights. This information would
ensure the integrity of the contracting process, simplify
the evaluation process, streamline the R?P, and improve




5. Conclusion ; The statement of work (SOW) is the
cornerstone of successful competition of contractor support
services. With the reduction in Government personnel and
the increase in mission responsibilities, Government technical
personnel are giving more attention to the preparation of
the SOW.
Recommendation : The contracting officer should focus his/
her attention on working closely with the Government technical
personnel in the preparation of a conclusive SOW particularly
in the early stages of the contracting process. The con-
tracting officer and the Government technical personnel must
be familiar with the Military Handbook 25^-A, Preparation of
the Statement of 'brk (S0' r ) .
6. Conclusion : Trom its enactment in 19^5. the Service
Contract Act has been fraught with problems, has engendered
disputes and controversy, reduced the flexibility of con-
tracting officers, and is in direct contradiction with several
national policies. The Act restricts competition, is admin-
istratively burdensome to both Government and industry, and
is highly inflationary. The forces of the competitive
marketplace—not legislation—should determine the price the
Government pays for contractor support services.
Recommendation : The Service Contract Act, as amended, should
be repealed. As supported in Chapter III, the repeal of this
"bad legislation" would increase competition, curtail the
inflationary spiral it imposes on successor contracts, reduce
conflict between the Department of Labor (DOL) and other
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agencies, shorten the contracting process, and give the
professional contracting officer authority commensurate with
his/her responsibility.
7. Conclusion ; Most incumbent contractors enjoy a
strong competitive advantage for follow-on contracts.
Reasons include familiarity with Government personnel and
missions, Government emphasis on past performance, data
rights and other "unique knowledge and expertise" gained
during contract performance, and the "successorship
obligation" under section Mc) of the Service Contract Act.
Recommendation : Although the contracting officer is not
obligated to neutralize the incumbent contractor's com-
petitive advantage, an "arms length" relationship must exist
at all times between the Government and the incumbent con-
tractor and proper surveillance during contract administration
must be maintained. The reduction of informal communication
(e.g. conversations which might provide helpful information
to a contractor not available to competitors), the elimin-
ation of Government generated "solicited proposals", and
ensuring that all competiting contractors are treated fairly
and equally will promote effective competition.
8. Conclusion : While the rapid growth of consultant
services has subsided in recent years, the number of con-
sultant contracts remains significant. The judicious use of
consultants, when justified, continues to be a viable source
of outside support service. However, the need for consultants
116

can frequently be obviated by alternative resources within
the ! :avy or other DOD organizations.
Recommendations ; The contracting officer must be familiar
with 0MB Bulletin No 78-11 and scrutinize all requests for
consultants, especially those of a non-competitive nature.
Experience, expertise, and past performance should be con-
sidered in competing for consultant services, with emphasis
being placed on the success of their implemented ideas or
recommendations
.
9. Conclusion ; The selection of the proper contract
type can encourage competition and is one of the most im-
portant decisions a contracting officer can make. There
are many factors to consider in determining the proper
contract type, each of which must be addressed with con-
tracting officer care and concern.
Recommendation : When the specific conditions delineated
under Contract Types , Chapter III of this thesis, exist,
firm fixed-price or firm fixed-price level of effort con-
tracts should be used. The increased use of two-step formal
advertising should be encouraged as well as negotiating for
a firm fixed-price contract when adequate specifications and
a conclusive statement of work exists. The contracting officer
should be innovative in his/her approach in determining the
proper contract type as evidenced by the successful on-




Other considerations may require the use of cost
reimbursement contracts , including the Cost-Plus-Award-Fee
(CPA7) , and the Indefinite Quantity/Labor Hour Contract.
The latter must be used with extreme care for, when used
incorrectly, it can restrict competition and invite care-
lessness for both Government and contractor personnel.
However, used correctly, the Indefinite Quantity/Labor Hour
Contract has many advantages due to its flexibility and re-
duced administrative burden that can be successfully applied
in an uncertain funding environment. Indefinite Quantity/
Labor Hour Contracts may also increase competition, make
more effective use of Government personnel, and glean the
benefits of consolidated procurement as evidenced by an
ongoing pilot plan executed and managed by the Naval Air
Systems Command (IJAVAIR).
10. Conclusion ; If the contracting officer focuses
his/her expertise and attention on the key aspects of the
pre-award phase as identified in this thesis, two major
benefits should result. First, effective competition will
be accomplished, and second, the success of the pre-award
phase will result in more effective and efficient contract
award and contract administration phases. Thus, the total
contracting effort is enhanced.
Recommendation : The contracting officer should concentrate
his/her efforts to the success of the pre-award phase of the





It is the purpose and intent that the preceeding
discussions surfaced a growing challenge to contracting
officers and offered a solid working background for the
contracting officer in understanding contractor support
services and, in particular, understanding the difficulties
associated with competing for these services. Diligent
application of this working background to the contracting
process should assist the contracting officer in promoting




The ^unctions of the Contract Review Board (ORB)
The CR3 consists of knowledgeable contracting personnel
(including counsel, small business specialists or technical
specials) who recommend actions to the contracting officer.
Its functions include but are not limited to:
a. weighing justification for sole source
b. considering competitive aspects of the requirement
c. considering application of small business
d. considering urgency and priorities
e. evaluating the kind and nature of work to be done
as nonpersonal services
f. ensuring the statement of work is conclusive
g. ensuring the contracting officer's technical
representative (COTR) has been approved
h. reviewing for conflict of interest—either kind of




Examples of Contractor Sup-port Services Thresholds
j Threshold Activity
:^0-500 Small purchase-no competition required
^500-10,000 Small purchase-competition required
^2,500 Service Contract Act 3? 98 to D0L
^10,000-100,000" l) Large purchase - competition required
2) Solicitation and award must be
synopsized in Commerce Business
Daily (CBD)
3) Contract Review 3oard (CRB) action
h) Determinations and Findings (Dei"7 )
5) Task or Delivery orders require
legal counsel approval
6) Personal vs. Nonpersonal Services
questionnaire
7) Evaluation hoard for R:PP * s
8) Commanding Officer approval for
requirements exceeding 50,000
9) Assignment of Contracting Officer
Technical Representative (CCTR)
10) Patent Counsel Review.
Over ''"100,000 Same as the activity enumerated above with
the additional requirements:
1) Pre-negotiation and Post-negotiation
Business clearance
2) Cost and pricing data for sole source
contracts (PL 87-653)
3) Request for Authority to Negotiate (RAN)
for Negotiating exception 11
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Washington D.C., phone interview 25 June 1979-
109- Scarce, P. J., Government Liaison Officer, Operations
Research Inc., Silver Spring, MD, interview granted 25
June 1979.
110. Schmidt, Manfred J., Contracting and Insurance Counsel,
Office of Personnel Management, Washington, D.C., phone
interview 25 June 1976
111. Schultz, Barbara , Contract Coordinator, Computation,
Mathematics & Logistics Department, David W. Taylor
Naval Ship R&D Center, Bethesda, MD, interview granted
29 June 1979.
112. Stanton, M. J., Special Staff Assistant, Systems Development
Department, David W. Taylor Naval Ship R&D Center,
Bethesda, MD, interview granted 21 June 1979-
113. Swenson, D. , LCDR, SC , USN, Supply Officer/Contracting
Officer, Naval Surface Weapons Lab, White Oak, MD,
phone interview 27 June 1979
•
11*K Thompson, Mort L. , Deputy Chief Counsel, Naval Supply
Systems Command, Washington, D.C., phone interview 27
July 1979.
115- Wertheimer, Franc, President ManTech of New Jersey,
Rockville, MD, interview granted 25 June 1979.
129

llo. Tilliams, W. B. , Procurement Analyst, U. S. Army
Procurement Research Office/Fort Lee, VA, phone
interview, 8 May 1979-
117- Zemanski, 3. D. , Procurement Officer, City of Ealtimore,
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